Dumping - Anti-Dumping
(chinadaily.com.cn)
Updated: 2006-10-09 14:58
If a company exports a product at a price (export price) lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market (normal value), it is said to be 'dumping' the product.
Dumping can harm the domestic industry by reducing its sales volume and market shares, as well as its sales prices. This in turn can result in decline in profitability, job losses and, in the worst case, in the domestic industry going out of business.
Often, dumping is mistaken and simplified to mean cheap or low priced imports. However, it is a misunderstanding of the term. On the other hand, dumping, in its legal sense, means export of goods by a country to another country at a price lower than its normal value. Thus, dumping implies low priced imports only in the relative sense (relative to the normal value), and not in absolute sense.
Anti dumping is a measure to rectify the situation arising out of the dumping of goods and its trade distortive effect. Thus, the purpose of anti dumping duty is to rectify the trade distortive effect of dumping and re-establish fair trade. The use of anti dumping measure as an instrument of fair competition is permitted by the WTO. In fact, anti dumping is an instrument for ensuring fair trade and is not a measure of protection for the domestic industry. It provides relief to the domestic industry against the injury caused by dumping.
Anti dumping measures do not provide protection per se to the domestic industry. It only serves the purpose of providing remedy to the domestic industry against the injury caused by the unfair trade practice of dumping.
What is anti-duThe anti-dumping duty is the provisional additional duty levied by the importing countries on the imported products which are identified as exporting dumping and bring about damage to the relevant domestic industries in order to boycott the dumping of the exporting countries and protect the domestic industries.
Dumping refers to that the imported products come into Chinese market at an export price lower than their normal value in normal trade.
According to the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Antidumping promulgated by the State Council on November 26， 2001 and effective as of January 1， 2002， any natural person， legal entity or relevant organization of domestic industry or representing domestic industry may apply to the MOFI'EC by law for anti-dumping investigation. Based on the results of the investigation， the MOFFEC and the State Economic and Trade Commission may make primary judgement respectively on dumping， damage and the tenability of causality of them.
Where the primary judgement confinus that the dumping is tenable and the dumping brings damages to the domestic industry， the provisional antidumping measures including levying interim anti-dumping duty may be taken.
The level of the interim anti-dumping duty should be matching with the dumping level primarily verified true.
The levying of the interim anti-dumping duty shall be suggested by MOFTEC， determined by the Tariff and Classification Committee of the State Council and then announced by MOFTEC. The Customs shall execute it from the date of its announcement.
The time period of the provisional anti-dumping measures shall be norreally 4 months starting from the date of decision announcement. In case of special circumstances， the time period may be prolonged to 9 months.
Within 60 days after the announcement of the anti-dumping investigation， no provisional anti-dumping measures should be taken.
During the antidumping investigation， the exporters dumping the imported products may promise to the MOFFEC of price change or stopping exportation at dumping price.
Where the MOFFEC believes that the price promise of the exporters may be acceptable， it may suspend or terminate the anti-dumping investigation and will not take the provisional anti-dumping measures or levy anti- dumping duty after discussion with the State Economic and Trade Commission.
Where the exporters break their price promise， the MOFFEC may， after discussion with the State Economic and Trade Connnission， immediately resmne the anti-dumping investigation. Based on the best information available， the MOFTEC may decide to take the anti-dumping measures and may retroactively pursue the anti-dumping duty on the products imported within 90 days prior to the taking of the provisional anti-dumping measure， except for the products imported before breaking the price promise.
Where the decision of the primary judgement justifies the dumping，damage and tenabihty of causality of them， the MOFFEC and the State Economic and Trade Commission should continue the investigation on the dumping and its level， damage and the level of the damage and make the final decision of judgement on basis of the results of the investigation.
Where the final decision of judgement justifies that the dumping is tenable and that it damages the domestic industry， anti-dumping duty may be levied.
The levying of the anti-dumping duty shall be suggested by MOFTEC，determined by the Tariff and Classification Committee of the State Council upon the suggestion of MOFTEC and then announced by MOFTEC. The Customs shall execute it from the date as announced.
The anti-dumping duty is applicable to the products imported after the date of the announcement of the final decision of judgement except otherwise Med.
The payers of the anti-dumping duty shall be the importing businessmen of the dumping products.
The anti-dumping duty should be determined in line with the dumping level of the exporters. In case of need to levy anti-dumping duty on the dumping importation products of exporters beyond the investigation， the antidumping duty should be determined in line with fair form. The level of the anti-dumping duty should not exceed the dumping level determined in final judgement.
Where the final judgement justifies the existence of the material damage and where the provisional anti-dumping measures have been taken before that， the anti-dumping duty may be pursued retroactively to the period of provisional anti-dumping measures.
Where the final judgement justifies the existence of threat of material damage and where the provisional anti-dumping measure have been taken for
the reason that later judgement of material damages would be made if not taking the provisional antidumping measm'es， the antidumping duty may be pursued retroactively to the period of the provisional antidumping measures.
Where the anti-dumping duty finally judged is higher than the interim antidumping duty paid or payable or than the value estimated for guaranty purpose， the part under collected shall be given up. Where the antidumping duty is lower than the interim anti-dumping duty paid or payable or than the value estimated for guaranty purpose， the part of duty overcollected should be rebated based on the practical circumstance or the duty should be recomputed.
The anti-dumping duty may be retroactively pursued to the dumping products imported within 90 days prior to the provisional antidumping measures if the following two circumstances coexist except for the products imported before the case is put on investigation：
a. The dumping products have a dumping history of damaging the domestic industries， or the imposing businessmen of the dumping products know or should know that the exporters are dumping the products and this dumping shall bring damage to the domestic industries；
b. Large quantity of the dumping products are imported in very short period and may serious damage the remedial effect of the antidumping duty.
Where the final judgement determines no antidumping duty to be levied or where the final judgement does not justify the retroactive pursue of antidumping duty， the interim anti-dumping duty already collected should be rebated.
Where the importers of the dumping import products have evidence proving that the anti-dumping duty paid is over the dumping level， they may apply to the MOFTEC for rebate of the duty. Upon examination， checking up and suggestion of the MOFTEC， the Tariff and Classification Committee of the State Council may decide to rebate the duty based on the suggestion of the MOFTEC. The rebate shall be executed by the Customs.
After levying anti-dumping duty on imported products， if the new exporters who do not export to China those products during the investigation can prove that they have nothing to do with the exporters subject to antidumping duty， they may apply to the MOFTEC for separate determination of the dumping level. The MOFTEC should quickly examine that and make final decision of judgement. During the examination， no anti-dumping duty should be levied on those products.
The time period for levying the anti-dumping duty is 5 years at maximum. However， the levying period of the anti-dumping duty may be extended properly if the termination of the levying might lead to continuity or recur rnce of the dumping and damage.
After the effectiveness of the anti-dumping duty， the MOFTEC may，after consulting with the State Economic and Trade Commission and under the condition of fair argument， decide to review the necessity of continuing to levy anti-dumping duty， or may， after fair length of time， decide to re iew the necessity of continuing to levying the anti-dumping duty at the request of the interest party and after examination of the evidence provided by the interest party.
Based on the review result， the MOFTEC shall put forward the suggestions as to maintain， revise or abohsh the anti-dumping duty. The Tariff and Classification Committee of the State Council shall make decision upon the suggestions of the MOFTEC and then the decision shall be announced by the MOFTEC.
mping duty Duties？
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China's steel industry was the largest anti-dumping investigations industry. Minmetals Import and Export Chamber of Commerce statistics, last year, China's steel anti-dumping involving a total of 15 cases, involving 1.95 billion yuan, iron and steel industry and color, clothing, footwear, like anti-dumping investigations, one of the key industries. Prior to this, our country there is a lot of steel products export tax rebates, some countries believe that China steel product of government subsidies, in the international market, China's large market share of steel products, export prices low and the dumping of steel products in China suspected heard.
The first half of 2008, involving China's iron and steel industry, a new anti-dumping investigation all-time high, which has a new investigation of 9 cases with final decisions have been made to 7, the anti-dumping cases last year than the total number of more , the European Union, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Indonesia and other countries have taken place in China's iron and steel products for the anti-dumping cases. Taking a panoramic view of the iron and steel industry products, and more anti-dumping cases, the existence of the following three salient features, the following key to the Canadian oil and gas to China seamless pipe brief analysis of anti-dumping as an example:
1. The existence of anti-dumping cases that the problem of non-uniform standards.
Standard anti-dumping cases that the crux of the problem is the fact of dumping and dumping margin found, for dumping the fact that the WTO is by comparing the export price and normal price found that the export price is lower than the normal price dumping, "normal price" is The fact that the existence of dumping of the decisive factors, but the "normal price" of that caliber because of the different statistics, the results are very different.
WTO rules, the normal price is often used to describe conditions in the general trade export of similar products in domestic comparable sales prices, such as the product of the domestic prices under control, often to third-country export prices of similar products to confirm the normal price. As part of the US-led Western countries not to recognize China's market economy status, the fact that the dumping and the dumping margin found on third-party countries often need to export prices, while the third-party countries to the fact that the dumping, how to determine the normal price There are also the standard problem of non-uniform. Such as: Canada Border Trade Department (CBSA) on February 7, 2008 China's exports to Canada of seamless oil casing anti-dumping, countervailing case the final decision to determine China's Tianjin Pipe Group Co., Ltd. and other enterprises involved in the case of six dumping margin of 37% ~ 45%; subsidy of 2% to 7%, other non-respondent enterprises dumping margin was 91%; subsidies for 38 percent; China's steel association that the CBSA in the absence of data to support a third country, to use in February 2008 magazine published a K55, N80 price of normal price, project L80, P110 casing of high-grade steel prices, as a basis for unilateral presumed the existence of dumping and dumping margin calculation is not right.
2. Anti-dumping and countervailing cases together, the specific implementation of double taxation.
Statistics show that took place in 2008 involving the 9 iron and steel industry in anti-dumping investigations, 5 the issue of anti-subsidy cases involving anti-dumping and countervailing cases have been closely together.
International Iron and Steel of China's iron and steel industry to accept the challenge of government subsidies. January 8, the League of the United States research group released a report that a large number of government energy subsidies in China become the world's largest producer and exporter of steel. Reported that in 2007, the Chinese steel industry is about 15.7 billion U.S. dollars of subsidies since 2000, an increase of 3800%. In addition, the CBSA in the casing of our seamless final anti-dumping identified Tianjin Pipe Group Co., Ltd. China, such as the existence of six enterprises involved in the case of 2% ~ 7% subsidy acts.
In the specific implementation of anti-dumping measures, the widespread dumping of international double taxation and subsidies. In today's world trade, anti-dumping anti-subsidy has become the main means of trade, therefore, for most countries to protect their own industry in violation of WTO provisions, the standard of double taxation. Such as: in the above-mentioned case, in Canada on a double standard there is the issue of double taxation, CBSA to determine China's Tianjin Pipe Group Co., Ltd. and other enterprises involved in the case of six-dumping rate of 37% ~ 45%; subsidy of 2% ~ 7 %, and other enterprises involved in the case of non-dumping margin was 91%; 38 percent subsidy. This should cause our government departments and relevant enterprises attach great importance to timely respond to the development of programs, organizations related enterprises to actively appeal and, when necessary, can be brought to WTO Dispute Settlement Body arbitration.
3. Anti-dumping cases is a complicated one, both sides involved in the case of information asymmetry, and lasted for a long time, huge amounts of money involved, covering a wide range of individual enterprises is difficult to take countermeasures, the need for government services, trade associations, guidance, steel enterprises to take measures jointly.
The existing framework of WTO, only governments, anti-dumping measures can be taken. Therefore, a country's trade or industry to pass the Government to initiate anti-dumping procedures. Usually a country's products if it finds that the existence of dumping practices, would be adopted by the Government to start anti-dumping investigations. If the export product under investigation to investigate a member of a member of dissatisfaction with the actions taken to bring the matter before the WTO can be resolved at this time, exporters must pass the national government would be able to take such action. In addition, the United States, the EU anti-dumping investigation procedures usually last for one year to 15 months, lasted for a long time, and the anti-dumping often involves a number of industry enterprises, the amount of up to several hundred million dollars.
Since 2008, China's steel industry experienced a number of anti-dumping investigations, of which, the United States, European Union, Canada, represented by the western countries on China's steel exports a wide range of anti-dumping investigations launched to reduce the domestic steel exports to China has caused great economic losses. While in the "General Agreement on Tariffs and" the issue of anti-dumping made it clear that countries in their own way but still the anti-dumping as a trade war with one of the main instruments of trade protectionism as the rise in the world, iron and steel anti-dumping cases have become worse.
钢铁行业是我国被反倾销调查最多的行业。五矿进出口商会统计，去年，我国涉及钢材的反倾销案件共15起，涉案金额19.5亿元，钢铁行业与彩电、服装、鞋业一样是反倾销调查的重点行业之一。此前，我国很多钢材产品存在着出口退税，部分国家认为中国钢材产品存在政府补贴，在国际市场上，我国钢材产品市场占有率高，出口价格低，对中国钢铁产品低价倾销的怀疑不绝于耳。
2008年上半年，涉及我国钢铁业的反倾销调查再创新历史新高，其中已经新立案调查的有9起，加上已经做出终裁决定的7起，反倾销案件比去年一年的总数量还多，欧盟、美国、加拿大、墨西哥、印尼等多个国家都发生了针对中国钢铁产品的反倾销事件。纵观钢铁业产品的多起反倾销案件，存在以下三个突出特点，下面重点以加拿大对中国无缝油气管反倾销为例简要剖析：
1.反倾销案件存在认定标准不统一的问题。
反倾销案件认定标准问题的关键是倾销事实和倾销幅度的认定，对于倾销事实的认定世贸组织规定是通过对比出口价格与正常价格来认定，出口价格低于正常价格就是倾销，“正常价格”是认定倾销事实是否存在的起决定性因素，但“正常价格”的认定因为统计口径不同，结果有很大差异。
世贸组织规定，正常价格通常是指在一般贸易条件下出口国国内同类产品的可比销售价格，如该产品的国内价格受到控制，往往以第三国同类产品出口价格来确认正常价格。由于以美国为首的部分西方国家不承认中国的市场经济地位，在倾销事实和倾销幅度的认定上，常需要第三方国出口价格，而以那个第三方国家来认定倾销事实，如何确定正常价格上也存在标准不统一的问题。如：加拿大边境贸易服务署（CBSA）于2008年2月7日对中国出口到加拿大的无缝石油套管反倾销、反补贴案最终裁决，判定中国天津钢管集团股份有限公司等六家应诉企业倾销幅度为37%~45%；补贴为2%~7%，其他非应诉企业倾销幅度为91%；补贴为38%；中国钢管协会认为CBSA在没有第三国数据支持，引用2008年2月某一杂志刊载的K55、N80的价格计算正常价格，推算L80、P110等高钢级套管的价格，单方面以此为依据推定存在倾销和计算倾销幅度是不妥当的。
2.反倾销案件与反补贴案件结合在一起，具体执行过程中存在双重征税的问题。
统计显示，在2008年发生的9起涉及钢铁行业反倾销调查中，有5起涉及反补贴问题，反倾销案件已经和反补贴密切结合在一起。
国际钢铁业存在对中国钢铁接受政府补贴的质疑。1月8日，美国制造联盟调查研究小组发布的一份报告称，大量的政府能源补贴使中国成为世界上最大的钢材生产和出口国。报告称，2007年，中国钢铁业补贴约为157亿美元，自2000年以来增长了3800%。此外，在CBSA在对我国无缝石油套管反倾销终裁中认定中国天津钢管集团股份有限公司等六家应诉企业的存在2％~7％补贴行为。
在反倾销措施具体实施过程中，国际上广泛存在倾销和补贴双重计算征税。当今世界贸易中，反倾销反补贴已经成为贸易战的主要手段之一，因此，为保护本国产业多数国家违反WTO的规定，采取双重计算标准征税。如：在上述案件中，加拿大就存在着双重计算标准双重征税的问题，CBSA判定中国天津钢管集团股份有限公司等六家应诉企业倾销幅度为37%~45%；补贴为2%~7%，其他非应诉企业倾销幅度为91%；补贴为38%。此举应引起我国政府有关部门及相关企业的高度重视，及时制定应对方案，组织相关企业积极上诉，必要时，可以提交WTO争端解决机构仲裁解决。
3.反倾销案件程序复杂，涉案双方信息不对称，且持续时间长，涉案金额巨大、涉及面广，单个企业很难采取对策，需要政府服务、行业协会指导、钢企联合采取措施。
现行世贸组织框架中，只有政府，才能采取反倾销措施。因此，一国的贸易商或产业界必须通过政府来启动反倾销程序。通常一国要是认定它国产品存在倾销行为，会通过政府启动反倾销调查。若出口产品受到调查的成员不满展开调查的成员所采取的行动，可以将问题提交世贸组织解决，此时，出口商必须通过本国政府才能采取这样的行动。此外，美国、欧盟的反倾销调查程序通常持续一年至15个月，持续时间长，且反倾销常涉及行业内多个企业，金额高达数亿元。
2008年以来，我国钢铁业遭遇了多起反倾销调查，其中，美国、欧盟、加拿大为代表的西方国家对我国出口的多种钢材展开了反倾销调查，缩减了国内钢材的出口，给我国造成了巨大的经济损失。虽然在《关税及贸易总协定》中对反倾销问题做了明确规定，但实际上各国各行其是，仍把反倾销做为贸易战的主要手段之一，随着贸易保护主义在世界范围内的抬头，钢铁反倾销案有愈演愈烈之势。
浅析我国频遭国外歧视性反倾销的原因及应对之策
来源：中国论文下载中心 [ 08-01-05 16:07:00 ] 作者：未知 编辑：studa20
三、我国频遭国外岐视性反倾销的原因
1.国外带有及其严重歧视性的反倾销政策导致反倾销案件的增加
长期以来，国外对我国产品进行反倾销调查时，均采用“替代国”方法计算倾销幅度，这种方法往往导致我国没有倾销的产品被裁定存在高幅度倾销。在我国市场经济建设已取得实质性成就的今天，大多数国家仍然无视我国经济体制的变化，或继续将我视为非市场经济国家，或通过立法将我国视为“市场经济转型国家”，同时规定严格标准，在某一具体案件中，只有我国企业符合这些标准后，才可以取消“替代国”方法的运用，而在大多数情况下，由于这些标准过于苛刻，也不具有科学性，我国企业也无法取得“市场经济地位”，结果依据“替代国”方法被课征高额反倾销税。这种歧视性的反倾销政策和做法不但使大量产品因为征税而退出当地市场，更严重的影响在于它客观上鼓励了进口国当地产业不断通过反倾销手段压制我国产品，从而导致案件数量高居不下。
在我国曾向美国出口蘑菇罐头倾销案中，美国商业部以印度尼西亚作为中国的替代国，理由之一是印尼的经济发展水平与中国相近。这一理由从一般意义上讲，似乎有一定道理（其实，据世行统计，当年印尼的人均国民产值高出中国一倍多），但两个国家的生产情况却不同。中国产蘑菇地区地处北温带，蘑菇可自然生长，生产成本较低，而印尼地处热带，蘑菇栽培需大量使用空调设备，成本必然高得多。以此为前提，将印尼的蘑菇罐头价格与中国的出口价格相比，很容易得出中国蘑菇罐头出口构成倾销的结论。所以西方国家在选择替代国时，尽管按照经济发展水平相当性的原则，但是“非市场经济国家”与替代国的同类产品价格还受很多因素的影响，包括比较优势，产业规模等因素的影响。因此计算出来的替代国价格往往严重脱离了“非市场经济国家”价格构成的实际情况。
因此从本质上来看，以不确定的替代国价格计算正常价值的依据，这本身就带有歧视性。反倾销是对贸易保护主义的简单包装，以使其看起来像个不同的东西。而且反倾销并非是为了公平竞争，它的目的是让竞争不公平，带有严重的歧视性。
2.WTO遏制非关税措施的使用使反倾销的作用更加突出
世贸组织成立后，传统的贸易保护做法，如配额、许可证等非关税措施已经受到严格约束。这种情况下，作为世贸组织允许的用于保护国内产业的反倾销手段的使用频率势必大大提高。反倾销已经成为WTO成员用以保护本国产业，抵制不公平竞争行为的最主要手段。过去只有少数西方国家立有国内反倾销法，但现在反倾销立法已经普遍化、全球化。因此近年来各国纷纷以反倾销为法律武器抵制不公平贸易，维护国内产业市场。更有甚者，有时达到滥用的程度，使反倾销变成贸易保护的工具。
3.我国经济的发展和出口竞争力的增强，使招致反倾销带有一定的必然性
改革开放以来，我国经济持续高速发展，外贸出口也成倍增长。我国产品不断打入世界市场的结果必然与进口国的相似产业产生激烈的竞争。由于我国产品具有劳动力和原材料的优势，在竞争中往往处于明显的有利地位，于是经营情况日益恶化的当地产业纷纷提起反倾销申请，希望借助这种手段将我国产品挤出本国市场。可以预见，随着我国经济的不断发展，越来越多的行业会与国外产生竞争冲突，这将客观上导致针对我国的反倾销案件在相当长的时间里保持较高的数量。
4.我国产业和企业自身存在的问题
我国目前的经济结构尚不合理，行业的发展缺乏长远规划，注重眼前利益。数量众多的企业分散经营，加之行业管理和协调力度不够，出口管理不够规范，最终导致反倾销案件的发生。例如苹果汁在早几年出口效益较好，各地纷纷设厂，结果由于大量出口使国外市场迅速饱和，最后在美国发生反倾销案件。另外我国对外出口市场对于集中，对某一地区出口量大且急剧增加势必也对当地市场产生冲击，而成为反倾销的对象。如我国金属镁产品向欧盟出口，1993年不足100吨，1996年竟达11000吨，如此巨幅的出口量增长，也就难怪欧盟对其实施反倾销[6]。
5.企业不应诉或应诉不力往往使对方轻易获胜
在对我国的反倾销案中，约有50%的案件无企业应诉，结果使对方不战而胜。不应诉的后果则意味着默认外国的指控。除因“统一税率”使企业应诉积极性降低之外，企业缺乏应诉意识是问题的关键所在。国外对我们一些产品实行反倾销，我们本来可以积极应诉并有可能胜诉，但一些企业不愿意打这样的官司，那就只能听人家说什么就是什么，时间长了，人家就觉得中国企业好“欺”，动不动就向我们的出口产品提起反倾销指控。另外，国内企业应诉经费不足，反倾销专业人员严重匮乏等问题也是导致企业应诉不利，结果仍是失败的原因。
四、对歧视性反倾销应对之建议与策略
反倾销已越来越成为一些发达国家首选的贸易措施，也是国际贸易中合法的贸易保护手段，因此我们出口产品时，应根据我们以往的经验教训，采取相应的应对策略。主要应从以下几个方面着手：
1.实现出口市场多元化和“走出去”战略，改善我国出口产品的国际形象，这是有效避免国外对华反倾销的前提条件。本着“以质取胜”的方针，引导出口企业提高出口产品的技术含量和附加值，大力发展国际市场容易大、技术含量高的产品，进而提高出口产品的价格，树立良好的产品形象；实施“走出去”战略，也可以使中国企业有效规避反倾销。到国外去投资建立生产基地，以品牌为核心，改变产品原产地，利用国外的原产地产品法，获得生产国的国民待遇。比如我国到墨西哥建立生产厂，产品的“户口”就在墨西哥。根据原产地规则，“中国造”产品与墨西哥产品一视同仁，而且还能自由出口到与墨西哥达成自由贸易协
议的34个国家和地区。[7]
2.政府应建立健全反倾销应诉机制，加大政府交涉力度，为企业应诉提供有利的支持和帮助。这需要做好以下工作：(1)建立反倾销协调机制，密切配合一致对外；聘请有经验、有影响的中外律师出庭抗辩；(2)建立反倾销应对基金，以缓解企业在应诉中财力不足的困难；外经贸部还可将中央反倾销专项基金的使用主动权适当下放给有关商会，让其有权主动掌握合理应诉基金，在一接到反倾销调查时，立即选聘律师，通知所有相关企业，准备材料，及时进行答辩，改变要求企业先出资后答辩的做法，促使其踊跃应诉；(3)采取切实有效的措施尽快培养一批精通国际反倾销应诉的专业法律人才，为反倾销应诉取得胜利提供有力的人力资源支持。
3.建立、完善行业协会组织。反倾销的应诉人是企业而不是一国政府，但遭反倾销的却是一国的所有企业，因而反倾销不是个别企业的事。由于反倾销案件很复杂，仅凭企业自身的力量难以取胜，所以在应对外国的反倾销时，一个行业内的主要企业的联合与某一两个企业单打独斗相比，是更有效率的，所以我们应重视行业协会等组织的建设。根据国家经贸部、国家统计局联合发布的《关于授予有关行业协会反倾销、反补贴、保障措施有关职能及委托有关工作的通知》，反倾销行业协会具备了相应的职能，主要职能有：动员涉案企业参加应诉；组织召开应诉会议；负责本行业产品出口价格的协调，维护出口秩序；参与本行业产业损害调查等。在对外应诉中发挥应有的作用，以维护企业的合法权益。
4.加大对外宣传我国的市场经济体系力度，坚决反对国外对我国歧视性的反倾销是政府和企业的共同责任。我国实行市场经济已有多年，并且是载入宪法和外贸法的，但仍有国家视我国为“非市场经济国家”且实施歧视性的反倾销，使我国的经济蒙受损失。尽管在我国入世谈判中，准许WTO成员国在中国加入世贸组织后的15年内仍可使用“替代国”的办法，但前提条件是我国企业不能清楚证明自己是在市场经济条件下运行的。[8]如果能证明，则对方应使用我国企业自己的生产成本或国内的销售价格。我国自2002年1月1日起实行的《反倾销条例》，足以表明我国的鲜明态度：决不允许国外产品在中国倾销，更不允许我国的产品到国外去倾销。为此无论是企业还是政府都必须不断加强对外宣传的力度，让世界更真实地了解中国。另外我国仍需加快完善市场经济步伐，依实际全方位的提高市场化程度，逐步实现向市场经济的全面转轨，方可早日成为世界公认的市场经济国，而免遭国外的贸易歧视。
5.建立灵活善变的经营策略也是提高企业竞争力、防遭反倾销的有效途径。随着国际竞争的加剧及生产要素市场的逐步规范化，靠低价竞销已不可行。种种迹象表明，我国开放的进程不会也不能停滞，尤其是在我国加入WTO之后，在市场准入与市场开放成为现实的情况下，我国企业将面临更加严峻的考验，首先要控制好出口产品价格水平，尤其要贴近进口国竞争产品的价格水平。还要控制好产品的数量的增长速度，切忌某项产品在短期内大量或成倍增长，不顾进口国市场容量以及进口国相关产业生产经营状况如何。所以出口企业应加强自律，发展公平、有序的出口贸易，在价格策略上企业只有变单一的价格竞争策略为综合灵活的非价格竞争策略，才可能真正获得高效益和持久的竞争力。政府要建立必要的惩罚制度，以保障出口外贸秩序的正常化。
6.不应诉或企业应诉不力是企业自断出路的做法，企业敢于应诉是处理反倾销问题有关键。在收到反倾销立案调查通知后，企业如不应诉，对方国就有权使用“最佳可获得信息”，这往往是对被起诉方很不利的数据。政府和有关主管部门要通过建立有效的激励机制和约束机制，扭转消极应诉的局面。外经贸部要将1999年制定的体现“谁应诉谁受益”原则的具体规定落实到位，并加大奖惩力度。对积极应诉企业在出口许可证和海关审价等方面给与补贴和重奖，调动企业应诉积极性。对应诉不力、大愿付出代价的甚至还利用别人艰苦努力赢得的反倾销“无损害”胜诉成果继续搞低价竞销的进行严厉处罚，甚至取消其生产经营权，外贸经营权等。我国近十年反倾销应诉的绝对胜诉率达37.5%，即无税和无损害结案。因此，我国企业面对反倾销诉讼必须快速应诉，同时还要做到应诉得力。反倾销案一旦开始，企业就应当努力获取充足的信息，充分准备好应诉材料，争取胜诉。因此政府应鼓励应诉，奖惩并举，对于应诉的企业要给予奖励，增加其出口配额，鼓励企业要勇于应诉，据理力争，不畏强权，捍卫自己的合法权益。这样才能将因遭受反倾销而带来的损失控制在一定范围内，维护国家和企业的利益，而且反倾销应速消极局面定会大为改观。
