信用卡风险论文的外文文献

TOPIC 1: Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market (信用卡市场的逆向选择)作者及写作年份:Lawrence M. Ausubel June 17, 1999部分摘要:trading situations where one (informed) party possesses information which is relevant to his (uninformed)trading partner, the informed party may find it advantageous to engage in trade only in states of informationwhich are relatively unfavorable from the viewpoint of the uninformed party. Thus, a firm which offers acontract to the general population may find that the composition of the pool of customers who accept thefirm's contract is inferior to the composition of the general population. The particular contractual termsoffered by the firm may influence the composition of the customer pool and, in some informationalenvironments, adverse selection may lead to a complete unraveling of the market (George A. Akerlof,1970).Many of the economically-richest implications of adverse selection have been drawn in creditmarkets. High interest rates charged to borrowers may induce adverse selection on default probability,leading banks to engage in credit rationing in high-interest environments (Joseph E. Stiglitz and AndrewWeiss, 1981). Competition along particular dimensions in credit card pricing may result in adverseselection, blunting the usual effects of competition, and contributing to sticky interest rates and extranormalprofits (Lawrence M. Ausubel, 1991). And, when borrowers have the opportunity to engage in signalingbehavior, the same structure of asymmetric information as in adverse selection models yields signalingstories which have important implications for corporate investment and the capital structure of firms (see,for example, Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979, and Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984).Yet despite a burgeoning economics and finance literature consisting of literally hundreds of articlesexploring the implications of adverse selection in credit markets, there remains little in the way of empiricalstudies which convincingly document the existence of adverse selection in credit markets as a real-worldphenomenon. The objective of the current paper is to present compelling direct evidence of adverseselection in one specific credit stakes in such an empirical exercise are quite considerable. It is frequently argued that virtuallyany conclusion may be reached from a suitably-chosen economic model of incomplete , to the extent that adverse selection can be shown to be a genuine empirical phenomenon in creditmarkets, then we can have confidence that at least one important component 阅读全文PDF格式: 阅读全文word格式: 2: Consumer Search Behavior in the ChangingCredit Card Market (不断变化的信用卡市场中,消费者的行为研究)作者及写作时间:Sougata Kerr & Lucia DunnSeptember 2002 部分摘要:Credit card balance switching has become an important issue in the banking community as cardholders seek to move their revolving credit to the lowest-cost lenders. This kind of “search and switch” behavior would be expected to put downward pressure on credit card interest rates. Previous research on the credit card market focused on why its interest rates persisted at levels greater than those for other types of consumer loans, and one explanation put forward was the inhibiting nature of high search costs in this market, especially for large-balance cardholders whose probability of credit rejection is high. Recent developments in the credit card industry – in particular the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1988 together with a large increase in direct solicitations – have changed the environment of this market substantially. Because of this new environment, as well as improvements in data availability, the issue of credit card search needs to be revisited. The current paper identifies those consumers whose probability of rejection is high and tests whether this probability has any impact on their search propensities. It does this by analyzing (i) the effect of large balances on the consumer’s probability of credit application rejection and (ii) how these factors – large balances and rejection probability –affect consumers’ search propensities. In testing the search-cost hypothesis, the issue of endogeneity between consumers’ search and the likelihood of rejection is dealt with by estimating a simultaneous equations model. The results presented here show no evidence that search costs deter consumer interest rate search in the credit card market of the 1990s, either for high-balance. This is officially known as the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988. cardholders with a greater probability of rejection or for low-balance cardholders. In the next section we review the relevant literature on this market and discuss recent changes in the market environment. Section III discusses our methodology and improvements in the recent data. Section IV presents our results. Finally, Section V concludes by summarizing our find......................阅读全文PDF格式: 阅读全文word格式:

1． Ausubel, Lawrence M., The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, American Economic Review, 1991, 81(1):50-812． Ausubel, Lawrence M., Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market, working paper, University of Maryland, 19993． Berlin, Mitchell and Mester, Loretta J., Credit Card Rates and Consumer Search, Review of Financial Economics, 2004,13:179-1984． Brito Dagobert L. and Hartley Peter R., Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards, Journal of Political Economy, 1995,103:400-4335． Calem, Paul S. and Mester, Loretta J., Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, American Economic Review, 1995, 85(5):1327-13366． Gross, David B. and Souleles Nicholas S., Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence From Credit Card Data, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,117:149-1857． Gross,David B. and Souleles Nicholas S., an Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency, Review of Financial Studies, 2002,15:319-3478． Stango, Victor, Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market, Review of Economics and Statistics, 2000,82:499-5089． Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, 1981,71:393-40910. 叶德珠，基于时间偏好不一致的信用卡利率结构设计[J]，数量经济技术经济研究，2004，8：134-14211. 胡少华，信用卡市场消费者行为研究：文献综述[J]，新金融，2005，10：57-6212. 吴恒兵. 信用卡业务风险的防范[J]. 河南科技 , 2003,(11)[1] 尹龙. 信用卡业务管理与监管制度的发展[J]. 中国信用卡 , 2008,(02)[2] 《中国信用卡》2005年总目录[J]. 中国信用卡 , 2005,(12)[3] 周宁. 商业银行信用卡业务发展思考[J]. 新金融 , 2003,(12)[4] 王青山, 宋晓波. 转变陈旧观念 树立全新意识[J]. 中国信用卡 , 1997,(04)[5] 胡大国，李惠. 信用卡业务必须整治[J]. 江西社会科学 , 1996, (09)[6] 朱溪, 杨杨, 林佳. 银行:挑战与机遇并存的盛宴[J]. 大经贸 , 2003,(09)[7] 辛云勇. 边缘者的出路[J]. 互联网周刊 , 2005,(30)[8] 林雪丹. 商业银行应加强信用卡业务的风险防范[J]. 福建金融 , 1998,(09)[9] 马腾. 信用卡业务亟待整合[J]. 了望 , 2005,(13)[10] 吴国民. 论我国商业银行信用卡业务的地位和发展战略[J]. 中国信用卡 , 1997,(05)

摘要：信用卡作为一种现代化的支付工具，其本身带有一定的风险性。如何有效地防范和化解信用一卡业务风险，减少发卡行损失，促进信用卡业务的健康发展，就成各信用卡发行机构共同探讨的重要课题。为此讨论了信用卡中的风险防范。关键词：银行；信用卡；风险；防范1银行信用卡的风险特点透支风险透支风险在信用卡风险中透支风险尤以恶意透支为严重，这些持卡人无视信用卡章程规定，欺银行不是国家权力机关不能绳之以法，利用银行信用卡结算，传递时间差冒险做案，侥幸逃窜，消遥法外，盲目自乐。风险一般来讲客户在办理信用卡时总是很直观地与储蓄存折、存单相比较。确实信用卡与存单、存折有许多功能相似之处，但又有与其相比更多的优点和更大的风险。存单、存折万一丢失，客户只要到办理存款的银行办理挂失即可阻止风险，而信用卡不慎丢失客户挂失后发卡银行则要上报总行迅速通知到全国成千上万个受理点和物约商户止付。然而由于使用信用卡出示的身份证有效期二十年之久，其年限跨度之大，使繁忙的银行和商户工作人员往往难以辨认身份证照片真伪，且冒用者只要在签字上略施小计便可蒙混过关巧取豪夺而后溜之，致使挂失后风险仍然存在。征信风险由于目前对于个人信用体系建设的滞后，导致银行在办理信用卡授信过程中信息不对称，同一申请人可以在不同的银行间多头授信，并缺少对过度授信的有效监测手段，为个别信用不良者恶意透支开了绿灯，形成过度授信，导致授信风险。同时，由于信用卡业务竞争中，放松了对持卡人的信用调查，对于信用卡申请者的个人资信审查也越来越流于形式，致使新推出的可透支信用卡在发卡量迅速上升的同时，恶意透支的持卡者的数量也在急剧上升，增加了信用卡业务产生坏账的风险。个人风险个人风险主要表现为信用卡持有人安全用卡意识不强，信用卡丢失后不及时挂失；密码设置过于简单或使用生日、电话号码作为密码，丢失后很容易被破译或被熟悉的人掌握等。捡拾他人信用卡后取款的情形占到信用卡案件总数的一半以上的情况，充分说明持卡人安全用卡的意识有待加强。2防范银行信用卡风险的措施强化立法控制发达国家对于银行卡交易的高度依赖是建立在高度成熟和完善的信用体系和法制基础之上的，我国应尽快建立和完善信用体系并健全法制。一是加快信用卡运行规则的立法，进一步规范信用卡业务；二是加快打击信用卡犯罪的立法现行刑法中只是对于使用伪造的信用卡等四种情况进行处罚，但是根据近几年来信用卡犯罪的新特点，还应该把领信用卡非法盗取他人信用卡信息等行为纳入刑事处罚的范畴，进一步净化信用卡的用卡环境。完善内控监督信用卡风险产生的其根本在于操作不规范，风险管理技术手段落后。因此，必须加强风险防范基础管理，有效降低信用卡经营风险。(1)完善标准化的业务流程，严格制度操作。一方面，按照银行卡业务管理办法%和信用卡章程及制度规定，严格业务流程，规范操作程序，注重加强对受理申请人证件审查，避免违法或者人为的违规操作。另一方面，随着跨行业务的快速发展及各商业银行和银联系统的逐步集中，对技术标准中不能适应发展要求的与业务规范不一致，影响业务开展的制度规定进行完善，规范标准，提高可操作性。(2)建立多级控制体系，在落实岗位责任，完善信用卡风险管理体系的基础上，实行风险防范责任制，明确分解各业务环节风险责任，加大考核奖惩力度，严格内部管理，使每一个业务人员和每一个操作环节都受到有效的控制和制约，防止见错不纠或放纵。(3)建立健全信用卡签发审查和使用监督制度。要加强对申请人的收入状况的审查，加强对担保人或担保单位的信誉状况及偿还能力的审查。信用卡发行者要对申请持卡人进行人工调查或发卡行建立数据库。发卡行严格控制信用卡透支用途、最长期限、最高额度和利率档次等规定，对各种不同类型的持卡人规定不同的透支额度，而且各个持卡人的透支额度可以因职业、教育水平和信誉状况不同而不同，规定持卡人一次消费的最高额度依持卡人的信用状况而动态确定，出现透支应及时收取本息。健全风险转化机制(1)严格信用卡担保制度。信用卡担保是信用卡业务中重要的一环。要逐步缩小信用担保、增大抵押担保的比例。资金担保一般属有价证券担保，应列表外科目核算，存单抵押应是本行开列的存单，由营业网点专夹保管，不得给予挂失和提前支取。(2)建立信用卡呆帐准备金机制。由于信用卡是集消费与信贷于一体的结算工具，有些透支发生逾期或呆帐损失是难以避免的，因而应按上年度末信用卡吸存余额的一定比例提取呆帐准备金，实行专户管理，以便风险发生后，可按规定数报批列支弥补。(3)建立信用卡保险机制。积极向保险公司投保，由社会来分担信用卡业务的风险，是银行信用卡管理的重要方式。一方面，让持卡人参加保险，使信用卡挂失后短期内的风险由社会承担，并规定保险与信用卡有效期同步，一旦信用卡遗失、被盗或被冒领而造成的损失由保险公司按比例赔偿另一方面发卡机构与保险公司协商，确定责任范围，按规定缴纳一定的保险费，当发生风险损失时，由保险公司负责赔偿。养成安全用卡的良好习惯信用卡持有人应避免信用卡密码设置过于简单化，以生日、电话号码等易被人掌握或猜测的数字作为密码；在ATM提款时要注意周围有无异常人或物，输入密码时用手在键盘上方进行必要的遮挡，防止密码被偷窥；一旦发生ATM吞卡情况，不要轻信机器旁边张贴的信息，而要及时与开户银行联系，寻求帮助；在刷卡消费时，信用卡不要离开自己的视线等。参考文献[1]张德芬.论信用卡法律关系的独立性与牵连性[J].河北法学，2005，4：59.[2]宋小桃，王宏芹.关于银行持卡人权益保护的法律思考[J].经济论坛，2005，10：64-65.[3]武剑.中国银行业实施内部评级法的前景分析与策略选择[J].国际经济评论，2003，2：40-43.[4]谢罗奇，李小林.我国商业银行操作风险及其防范对策探析[J].石家庄经济学院学报，2006，(4)：483-487.