商业银行的论文英文参考文献

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Make Every Document a Marketing Document Every scrap of paper that leaves your business is performing a marketing 's idea is not earthshattering, but it is one that many businesses, large and small, send invoices, fax covers, memo, notes, request and all other manner of "non-marketing" related correspondence to - you guessed it, your clients, referral sources and 's a pretty simple thing to A) make sure that these documents also conform to the image you project in your marketing materials and B) make them sell a no harm in introducing a new product in every communication, regardless of how mundane.

• Put your company story on the back of work orders
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• Insert a coupon for a special offering in your statements
• Put two business cards in your thank you notes

银行英语口语英语专业毕业论文范文商务英语毕业论文范文银行信用风险的成因及防范

这里有无数的银行营销类的文章

附件二：毕业论文英文资料翻译英文资料一作者：Richard Podpiera题目：Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform中国银行业改革的进步出处：IMF Working Paper Series 2006国际货币基金工作报告93号2006年3月英文资料二作者：Doug Pearce题目：Reform of China's Banks, Burdened by Bad Loans, is Priority for Government改革中国银行不良贷款带来的负担,是政府的要事出处：State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Vol. 71, pp. 533–59June 2005中国股份制企业银行信用7卷，53-59页2005年6月I IntroductionThis Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Substantial effort has been devoted to reforming China’s banking system in recent years. The authorities recapitalized three large state-owned banks, introduced new governancestructures, and brought in foreign strategic investors. However, it remains unclear the extent to which currently reported data reflect the true credit risk in loan portfolios and whether lending decisions have started to be taken on a commercial basis. We examine lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending from 1997 through 2004 to look for evidence of changing behavior of the large state-owned commercial banks (SCBs). We find that the SCBs have slowed down credit expansion, but that the pricing of credit risk remains undifferentiated and banks do not appear to take enterprise profitability into account when making lending decisions. Controlling for several factors, we find that large SCBs have continued to lose market share to other financial institutions in provinces with more profitable enterprises. The full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years, however, and these issues should be revisited in future reforms are at the core of China’s strategy to improve the intermediation of its large private sector savings. Reforms in the banking sector have been implemented over the last two decades in China, replacing the monobank system with a multilayered system that separates commercial lending and central banking functions. However, lending by stateowned commercial banks (SCBs) has been inefficient and focused on state-owned enterprises, has brought a large burden of nonperforming loans, and has triggered several attempts to recapitalize and reform the banks. One important restructuring action came in 1999, when the government transferred a substantial amount of nonperforming loans to companies at book The most recent major initiative to improve the functioning of the banking sector started in late 2003, when the government decided to recapitalize two of the four major SCBs and introduce changes in legal structure, corporate governance, and risk management, with the goal of bringing in strategic investors and eventually listing the banks. This effort has been partly motivated by the prospects of facing increased competition when, at the end of 2006 under the World Trade Organization agreement, the sector will be opened to foreign paper focuses on reforms in the four SCBs, which continue to be the major part of the banking system in China. At end-2004, the four SCBs—the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)—accounted for almost 60 percent of banking system We reviewed the progress in reform implementation and examined lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending to look for evidence of changing behavior of the SCBs. While the full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years’ time, we believe it is useful to explore any changes in the behavior of SCBs—in response to the long-term reform effort and as an initial reaction to the most recent previous studies describe the reform effort and the inefficiency of the Chinese stateowned IMF (2004 and 2005) provides an overview of the most recent reforms and Barnett (2004) reviews the structure and recent developments in the banking sector. For a review of previous banking system reforms, since the mid-1990s, see Karacadag (2003).Duenwald and Aziz (2003) explored the growth-financial-development nexus in China and concluded that, contrary to most cross-country studies, financial development (proxied by total bank lending) has not significantly boosted growth among China’s provinces. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) found that the correlation between investment and savings at the provincial level is strong and increased in the 1990s when SCBs were given more autonomy in allocating regional credit. This suggests the existence of large barriers to capital mobility, possibly in the form of noncommercially motivated interference in bank lending has been made on reforming the SCBs, but more needs to be done to make banks more efficient. The two pilot reform banks, the BOC and the CCB, have likely met the 2005 quantitative targets set in their restructuring plans. They have completed their financial restructuring, introduced new governance structures, and started improving risk management and internal controls. The approval in 2005 of a reform plan for the largest bank in the system, the ICBC, was an important step. Furthermore, all three banks have recently introduced minority strategic investors. However, the last state commercial bank—the ABC—still lacks a restructuring plan. Remaking and modernizing the operations of these banks, increasing their commercial orientation, and establishing a strong credit culture are major undertakings that will inevitably take time to implement and to yield substantial next two sections describe the progress in reforms of two large SCBs that were chosen as a pilot for reforms (the BOC and the CCB) as well as reforms in other banks. Section IV then explores any impact the reforms have had on bank lending decisions, level of credit risk, and credit risk pricing. Section III concludes and outlines key areas for further REFORMS IN TWO PILOT BANKSThe BOC and the CCB were selected as pilot banks for the latest reform effort, whichcommenced in late 2003. In December 2003, the authorities announced the decision torecapitalize these two banks with $45 billion from foreign exchange reserves and to develop a broader reform plan. These plans involved strengthening their corporate governance and risk management, resolving non-performing loans (NPLs), using reputable external auditors to assess the true financial position of the banks, as well as enhancing external oversight of the banks’ operations. The authorities also set the goal of bringing in strategic investors and listing the banks’ , good progress has been made in implementing the reform plans in the two pilot banks. Financial restructuring of the BOC and the CCB has been completed. Both banks have likely met the 2005 quantitative targets, were incorporated as joint stock companies, introduced new corporate governance structures, have worked on changing risk management and internal organization, brought strategic investors, and either were listed (CCB) or appear on track to do so in 2006 (BOC). However, it will likely take time before the ongoing changes become fully BOC and the CCB basically met two 2004 quantitative targets and likely met the firstfull set of quantitative targets for 2005 (Table 1). There were only two quantitative targets set for 2004, the ratio of NPLs to total loans and capital adequacy. The completed financial restructuring, including the $45 billion capital injection and NPL write-offs and sales, helped the two banks meet these , 2004 performance and preliminary information for 2005 suggest that the banks were on track to meeting the first full set of quantitative performance benchmarks at steps have been taken in corporate governance, internal organization, and riskmanagement reforms. Both banks have been transformed into joint-stock companies—the Bank of China Limited and China Construction Bank Corporation—and have put into place a new corporate governance structure with a shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors, and top management operating according to newly adopted rules. The BOC board of directors, for instance, now consist of 13 directors, of which 7 are non-executive directors, 3 are executive directors, and the remaining 3 are international senior financial experts serving as independent Both banks prepared, adopted, and started to implement development plans that deal with a number of operational areas, including internal organization and control, strategic development, and risk management. However, important concerns about governance and internal controls remain. Several scandals, including high-level corruption at the CCB and embezzlement at the BOC, have been uncovered during the implementation of recent reforms. While these were related to events that occurred prior to the reforms, they highlight the need to implement improvements in internal control systems and governance. Furthermore, while the formal corporate governance structure has changed substantially, the way business is done may not have changed much just yet. For instance, recent reports argued that, in the CCB, the board was the nominal final decision maker, but board members were not routinely involved in important Separately, the implementation of reforms in risk management only started, and it will certainly take some time before they are fully implemented throughout the relatively large banks have introduced strategic investors with a minority ownership Byoffering an ownership stake, the banks generally expect to diversify the ownership structure, enhance their capital strength, take advantage of the partner’s management and technology expertise, and launch joint operations in selected areas