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Too-big-to-fail: Bank failure and banking policy in Jamaica J. Daleya, , , K. Matthewsb and K. Whitfieldb aDepartment of Management Studies, University of the West Indies, Mona, Kingston 7, Jamaica bCardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU Wales, UK Received 7 October 2005; accepted 16 December 2006. Available online 22 December 2006. Abstract Research on the causes of bank failure has focused on developed countries, particularly the United States of America. Relatively little empirical work has examined developing countries. We examine the total population of banks in Jamaica between 1992 and 1998 and find that real GDP growth, size, and managerial efficiency were the most significant factors contributing to the failure of banks. Bank failure is defined to include bailout and regulator-induced or supervised merger. Our results suggest that there were implicit ‘too-big-to-fail’ policies during this period. Keywords: Bank failures; Too-big-to-fail; Developing economies; Jamaica JEL classification codes: G21; G28 Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Bank failure in Jamaica 3. Bank failure literature 4. Data and methodology 5. The likelihood of failure 6. Failure and bail-out 7. Conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix A. Pool of variables References 1. Introduction The last decade of the 20th century was unprecedented in Jamaica's financial history. Of a population of 37 banks, 21 were classified as failed, with 14 being so classified in 1 year—1998. However, few outright closures occurred. Most problem banks were merged with other banks, or continued to operate through financial support from the government. More than a half of domestic banks received some kind of financial support from the government, initiated voluntary bankruptcy proceedings or surrendered their licences. Explanations for such banking problems vary. Empirical research on bank failures separates the causal factors into bank-specific, industry-specific, macroeconomic and other. However, much of the debate on developing countries has neglected banks at the individual level, and has focused on the problems faced at the sector or industry level. Moreover, the (often conflicting) results of existing studies do not offer inferences about the factors that are particularly significant in developing countries, or to those that are significant to the failure of individual banks, or to the fate of problem banks. This paper addresses the following questions: what factors were significant in the banking crisis in Jamaica? What factors influenced how the crisis was handled and was there an implicit too-big-to-fail (TBtF) policy? What are the lessons for bank regulators in developing economies that can assist in better preparedness for the future? To address these questions, the within-sample performance of a panel of Jamaican banks is examined. Some of the factors identified as contributing to failure include deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, rapid expansion and weakness in a range of bank-specific factors: capital, management, and liquidity. The size results are particularly significant and point to the operation of implicit ‘TBtF’ policies. Larger banks are more likely to fail, but are also more likely to be bailed out rather than closed. The next section discusses the banking crisis in Jamaica. Section 3 reviews the literature on bank failures. Section 4 discusses data and methodology. Sections Sections 5 and 6 present the results, and Section 7 concludes. 2. Bank failure in Jamaica The term ‘bank failure’ has been interpreted varyingly. The more precise definitions have focused on accounting factors (for example, [Martin, 1977] and [Benston and Kaufman, 1995]), economic factors ([Bell et al., 1990] and [González-Hermosillo et al., 1997]), or legal factors (Meyer and Pifer, 1970). Conversely, more general definitions have attempted to be all-inclusive and have applied a ‘catch-all’ combination of specific definitions (for example, Thomson, 1992). Using a general definition of ‘bank failure’ embracing closure, bankruptcy, supervised merger, or direct government assistance, we assess the population of banks in Jamaica over the period 1992–1998.1 Table 1 shows a comparative profile of the Jamaican banking sector before and after the crisis. Table 1. Banking system profile: pre- and post-banking crisis Jamaican banking sector

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现代金融学的发展一、金融问题中的不确定性研究在21世纪以前的经济学研究中，研究者大多关注的是企业中的投入产出效率问题，由于当时资本市场化程度低，很少有人专门研究与资本决策有关的问题，尽管如此，还是有些研究成果对以后金融学的发展起到了很大的推动作用，其中最大的贡献是资金时间价值概念的提出。随着金融市场的发展，以及人们对不确定性概念的认识，进入30年代以后产生了大量对金融决策问题的研究成果，同时这些成果又积极推进了金融市场的活跃与发展。在本文以下部分简要概述与评价了这一时期的重要研究成果。（一）不确定性研究在资产定价领域中的应用1.证券组合理论与资本资产定价模型在整个金融分析的框架中，不确定性概念的引入是具有重大作用的。最早Kenes(1936)和Hicks(1939)提出了风险补偿的概念，认为由于金融产品中的不确定性的存在，应该对不同金融产品在利率中附加一定的风险补偿。随后，Von Neumann(1947)应用预期效用的概念提出了解决在不确定性条件下的决策选择的方法，在此基础上Markowiz(1952)发展起了证券组合理论，他认为投资者选择证券组合时关注的只是未来现金流的均值与方差。他假设投资者的预期效用符合二次分布或者是多项式分布。Markowiz的主要研究结论是在不确定的前提下，最优的投资决策是分散化持有。Tobin(1958)认为投资者出于自身流动性偏好的不同选择收益与风险的均衡。这进一步完善了证券组合选择理论的框架。在资产定价领域另一著名的理论模型就是资本定价模型(CAPM)，Sharp(1994)和Lintner(1995)用公式简明地表述了资产组合的价值与无风险利率以及资产的风险水平之间的关系。Black(1972)推出了即使在不存在无风险资产的情况下，Sharp和CAPM公式仍然成立，只是无风险利率被包括整个市场上所有资产的证券组合的预期收益率代替。与CAPM模型同时代出现的资产定价模型还有Ross(1977)的套利定价模型(APT)和Lucas(1978)典型代理资产定价模型。以CAPM为代表的资产定价模型，为资产定价提供了一个简洁的计算方法，并且得到了一些在实证方面的研究的支持(Fama and Macbeth,1973)，但是对现实中的一些异常现象仍然缺少有效的解释能力，Brennan(1989)认为CAPM是建立在所有投资者对投资的预期与风险都具有共同的估计与判断，并且所有投资者的效用函数一致的假设基础之上，这一假设与现实不一致，这是导致CAPM对一些现实问题缺少解释力的根本原因。以后正是对这些假设的质疑，推动了信息不对称概念的提出与研究。2.市场有效性假说市场有效性假说认为，在一个完全竞争市场中，不存在不对称信息与市场摩擦，影响未来平均收益的只是投资风险的不同。在20世纪60年代有大量研究工作者对市场有效性假说进行了检验，Fama(1973)通过对美国证券市场的实证检验，认为有效市场假说是成立的，但是很多研究人员发现了在市场中，存在着许多市场有效性假说或者CAPM模型解释不了的异常现象。例如，Basu(1977)发现资产的平均收益除了与CAPM中的β系数有关外，还与资产的价格盈利比率（P/E比率）有关，在相同β系数下，价格盈利比率高的股票（成长型股票）的市场价格好于价格盈利比率低的股票（价值型股票）；Benz(1981)发现股票的市场价格还与上市公司的规模有关；Stattman(1980)发现股票的价格与账面价值的比率（P/B比率）也是影响股票价格的重要因素。Fama和French(1993)在以上研究的基础上提出了三因素模型，即在影响资产价格的β因素外，加入了P/E比率和P/B比率因素。另外，许多研究人员从时间序角度研究也发现了一些市场有效假说与CAPM解释不了的异常现象，其中最为著名的就是Pozeff和Kinney(1976)发现的所谓“一月效应”；他们发现在纽约证券市场的指数在一月期间的存在明显低于其他月份的现象；还有就是Cross(1973)和French(1980)发现存在类似的“星期一效应”，以后许多研究人员在世界范围内验证了这两种现象的存在。对这些异常现象的解释，有效市场假说显得无能为力，有人曾经试图将“一月效应”解释为到年末税收流出的影响，但是在英国、澳大利亚等税收年度不在12月份的国家，仍然存在“一月效应”就无法解释了。有些学者从心理学的角度解释这些异常现象，例如，Dreman(1982)将股票价格的P/E比率效应解释为，由投资者总是过高估计具有高成长性股票的成长性，导致市场中具有高P/E比率的股票的价格被高估了，这是导致股票收益率低的原因。3.连续时间模型在资产定价理论中的另一个重要假设是：证券市场总是在连续过程中，在这一假设前提下，Merton(1969,1971)将CAPM发展为瞬时资本资产定价模型(ICAPM)，同样在信息对称、无摩擦的市场中，资产价格的变化符合Ito过程，在这种条件下，资产的价格与投资者的效用偏好无关。在随后的研究中Merton(1973)和Black(1973)应用以上连续时间模型成功地得到了期权定价公式，这一公式后来被大量的实证研究所证实，并且被广泛在实践中应用。（二）不确定性研究在公司财务管理中的应用金融分析研究的另外一个重要领域是公司财务管理，主要研究公司在投资决策中的有关负债与权益比例选择、公司的红利政策等问题。最早这方面的研究成果由Modigliani和Miller(1958)作出，他们的研究显示，在完全市场中（没有市场摩擦与信息不对称存在）公司的价值与公司的负债比率无关（M-M定理）。类似的研究结论还有，公司的价值与公司的利润分配政策无关。显而易见，这些研究结论与现实中的事实不符。依据M-M定理的结论，公司在利润分配时，由于派发现金红利会有现金流出，公司将更愿意选择股份回购的政策，而不是红利政策，而在现实中，许多公司更愿意选择分红而不是股份回购，这一现象被Black(1976)称为“公司红利的困惑(Dividend Puzzle)”，对此Miller(1977)所能给出的解释是，M-M定理的结论之所以与现实不同在于税收与所谓的破产成本对财务结构的影响，是由于一定的负债可以使公司达到税收减免的作用，另外由于对高负债率公司存在着破产的风险，所以负债率对公司股票价值存在影响，Miller以及其他的学者对这些财务问题做出的解释总体来说都不很令人满意，直到后来引入不对称信息以后，似乎才对这些问题的解释取得了突破。二、金融中的不对称信息问题的研究正如前文所述，对现实中的一些现象很难单纯用不确定性（风险）来得到满意的解释，正是在对这些问题的研究引起了人们对金融问题中的不对称信息的关注，加上在20世纪60年代以博弈论为代表的信息经济研究方法的突破，使得许多学者在对金融问题中的不对称信息的研究中取得了很多成果，特别是用不对称信息可以完美地解释许多有关财务结构方面的问题。以下仍然分两部分概述这方面的成果，首先是在财务决策方面的成果，接下来是在资产定价方面的成果。（一）不对称信息在公司财务管理中的应用1.红利信号模型关于公司红利决策的困惑引起了许多学者的关注，除了以上提到的公司更愿意支付红利而不愿意将利润用于股份回购的异常现象之外，Lintner(1957)还发现公司在进行红利决策时，由于受累进税制的影响，更愿意使各年的红利平滑些，所以公司每年的红利波动要远远小于股票价值波动，有关税收减免的理论解释较为理想，并且在以后被许多学者用实证方法证实了这一现象的存在（例如：Fama and Babiak,1968）。但是税收效应并没有很好解释公司为什么更愿意支付红利的困惑。最早Miller(1961)注意到红利可能是向投资者揭示公司发展前景的信号，但是直到Bhattacharya(1979)才应用博弈论方法建立起了红利模型，Bhattaeharya成为第一个将博弈论引入金融分析的学者，Bhattacharya认为公司的管理者对公司投资项目的前景与其他普通投资者相比具有信息方面的优势，管理者通过公司的尽可能高的红利向普通投资者传递信息，如果公司红利水平高意味着公司投资项目的未来前景好，而对于无法支付高额红利的公司将不得不向银行贷款，从而担负过高的财务成本。以后许多学者在此基础上对模型又进行了一个改造(Miller and Rock,1985;John and Williams,1985)。但是仍有学者质疑认为，按照以上模型认为只有在公司需要为新项目向市场融资时，才有积极性支付高水平的红利，但事实上模型的红利支付水平并不受公司是否有新项目的影响。也就是说，上面的信号模型不能很好解释红利的平滑性。为此，Kumar(t988)发展出了一个粗糙信号(Coarse Signaling)模型，其结论认为公司在一定的利润范围内会支付同样水平的红利，直到公司的利润水平超出了这一范围，公司管理者才会调整红利支付水平。红利信号模型的另外一个问题是，公司为什么愿意支付红利，而不是股票回购。Ofer和Thakor(1987),Barclay和Smith(1988)用逆向选择原理解释了这一现象，他们认为公司更愿意在市场上自己股票被低估时回购股票，所以回购股票行为向市场传达了股票价值被低估的信号，所以会引起股票价值的上涨，从而使公司支付了额外的成本，而用红利分配利润不存在这一逆向选择问题。2.资本结构正如上文提到的，公司资本结构问题的研究在引入不对称信息以前一直没有得到令人满意的结论。应用博弈论描述公司资本结构的决策过程，大大推动了对公司基本结构决策研究的发展。最早Ross(1977)建立了一个公司负债决策的博弈模型，其中公司通过负债率向资本市场传递公司未来经营前景的信息，由于高负债率可能导致公司破产的风险加大，而一旦公司破产将为公司的经营者带来损失，所以只有公司管理者对公司未来的现金收益乐观时才会在资本结构决策时选择贷款，提高负债率。而前景乐观的公司提高负债率的决策是前景悲观的公司所无法模仿的，所以对资本市场来说，高负债率是公司发展前景乐观的信号。随后在Myers(1984)的模型中，认为如果管理者在公司项目发展需要融资时，如果管理者认为目前市场上自己公司股票价值被市场高估了，会选择通过发行股票的直接融资方式，而如果管理者认为公司股票价值被低估了，就会选择贷款等间接融资方式，所以说公司增加发行股票向资本市场传递的是公司目前股票价值被高估的信号。Myers认为经营者在面对新项目需要投资时首先选择的是用自身盈利积累完成投资，其次是选择贷款等间接融资方式，最后才会选择发行股票的融资方式，这被称之为“融资顺序理论(Pecking order theory of finance)”。在金融分析中应用博弈论的不对称信息理论取得较大成绩的研究就是所谓的代理问题的研究，Jensen和Mecking(1976)指出公司中存在两类代理问题，其一是债权人与股东的代理矛盾，其二是股东与公司管理者的代理矛盾。债权人与股东间的矛盾表现在股东总是扩大公司投资风险，因为项目成功了超额收益全部是股东的，而如果公司经营失败，破产的成本由债权人与股东共同负担。Diamond(1989)通过研究认为，在长期重复博弈条件下，股东的声誉可以在一定程度改善股东和债权人间的矛盾。股东与管理者间的矛盾是由于股东不能有效控制管理者的经营行为，因而管理者会最大化自己的利益，可能会损害股东利益。在80年代末与90年代，出现了有大量关于代理问题的研究成果，Hart和Moore(1989,1994,1998)研究发现当企业家计划投资新项目而需要向外融资时，与投资者签订贷款合同是最优合同，得到这一结论的关键在于虽然企业家与外部投资者在项目未来进展的各个时期都可以观察到项目的收益情况，但是第三方（例如：法官）无法观察到项目的收益，此时贷款合同是最优融资合同，并且Hart认为由于贷款人在企业家不能偿还贷款时可以控制公司的资产，所以企业家有积极性偿还贷款。3.公司所有权控制市场公司所有权控制市场的概念最早是由Manne(1965)提出的，他认为为了有效的配置资源，公司所有权控制市场的存在是必要的，现代资本市场的有效运转离不开公司所有权控制市场的存在。在公司所有权控制市场中所有权的转移方式是多样化的，包括：收购、兼并、股票的发行以及委托代理关系的变化等手段。在传统的完全竞争、无摩擦的资本市场假设下，很少考虑公司所有权转移对公司价值的影响，而事实上每次兼并收购活动都会引起公司股票价值的大幅波动。直到进入80年代以后非对称信息概念的引入，使得人们认识到了公司所有权控制市场对资本市场影响的内在机制。Crossman和Harl(19803研究了在公司收购过程中存在所谓的“免费搭车问题(Free Rider Problem)”，他们认为当收购方发现一个目标公司的运营效率低下，而决定收购目标公司时，面对外部的标购，原有的股东知道收购者通过收购后公司在新的经营者经营下，效率会提高，所以会自发抵制收购，等待收购价格的升高，直到收购价格升高到在新经营者的经营水平下的合理的价格时，原有股东才会出售手中股票。考虑到收购方在收购过程中搜集信息、组织收购是有成本的，所以采用标购行为实际上为收购方带来了损失。Shleifer和Vishny(1986)认为，如果收购方在标购目标公司以前就已经持有了目标公司的一定股票，可以解决上述“搭车问题”的困惑，收购方可以用自己手中股票的增值弥补收购带来的损失。然而Shleifer和Vishny的结论并没有在实证中得到证实，反而Desai和Kim(1988)的实证结果认为大多数的收购方在标购前并没有持有目标公司的股票。在收购行为研究方面的另外一个困惑就是收购行为往往导致股票价格的大幅上涨，例如：Jennings和Mazzeo(1993)发现收购发生时的收购人对目标公司的首次出价，大多数高于收购前10天的股票价格的20%。Fishman(1988)将这种现象解释为是由于有潜在竞争者随时会加入收购，较高的出价是为了阻止竞争者加入。4.新股发行(IPO)在1963年在由美国证券交易委员会组织的一项研究中，首次发现在新股上市后的短期存在着明显的超额回报的现象，以后许多学者在许多国家发现了这一现象，例如：Ibbotson和Ritter(1995)统计得出美国纽约证券市场1960-1992年发行新股的首日的超额回报是15.3%。在许多年中IPO现象成为挑战市场有效性假说的又一个证据。对IPO现象最早的解释是由Rock(1986)作出的，Rock认为IPO现象实质是个逆向选择问题，新股上市时市场上存在着两类投资者，一类是具有信息优势的投资者，一类是不具信息优势的投资者，信息投资者只是在新股定价低于其真实价值时才购买，而当定价高于其真实价值时只有不具信息优势的投资者才会参加购买，所以平均来说，不具信息优势的投资者购入了较大比例的被过高定价的股票，为了在市场中留住不具信息优势的投资者，公司在初次发行新股时常常有意低定价。类似Rock对IPO超额回报问题的解释，许多研究人员给出了这一问题的其他合理解释，例如：Allen和Faulhaber(1989)以及Grinblatt和Hwang(1989)将新股发行低定价解释为公司未来前景良好的信号；Hughes和Thakor(1992)认为公司新股发行低定价是为了规避诉讼风险；Ruud(1993)认为新股上市后的短期高回报是由于承销商的价格稳定活动造成的。在IPO领域中的另外一个难以解释的现象就是新股上市后长期表现不好。Ritter(1991)研究发现，在1975-1984年间发行的新股在发行后3年间的回报比正常股票的回报至少低15%。以后Loughran(1993,1995)再次证实了这一现象的存在。Shiller(1990)用所谓“主持人效应”解释新股长期回报不好的现象，他认为新股上市的初期承销商出于对自身声誉的考虑会创造短期超额需求的假象，随后随着承销商从市场的退出，导致了新股长期回报不佳的现象。（二）不对称信息在资产定价领域中的应用Grossman和stiglitz(1980)最早将非合作不对称信息的概念引入资产定价领域的研究中，建立了所谓资产定价的理性预期均衡理论，他们认为资本市场中的每个参与者都从市场价格的变化中获得信息（所谓的学习过程），并且每个参与者的行为不会对市场价格构成影响。在80年代初期这一理论成果主要用于解释公司财务方面的问题，直到Kyle(1985)以及Kyle和Milgrom(1985)研究做市商制度下的价格形成机制的成果出现以后，不对称信息对资产价格的影响才越来越多地引起人们关注，以后在Kyle Milgrom框架的基础上出现了大量的研究成果。由于在这一框架下的价格决定机制不同于Modigliani Miller的市场均衡机制，是通过研究具体市场条件下的资产价格形成机制，所以常常将这部分研究成果称为市场微观结构理论。Kyle研究了在做市商制度下证券市场的价格形成机制，在Kyle的模型中，市场由三类参与者构成：风险中性的做市商、噪音交易者和信息交易者，噪音交易者出于自己的流动性需求进入市场交易，信息交易者根据自己的信息交易，为了最大化自己的利益，信息交易者选择自己在市场上的交易数量。与Kyle不同之处在于，Milgrom建立的序贯交易模型(Sequential Trade Model)中交易者每次交易的数量都是固定的，即每次都只能买入或卖出一个单位的资产，做市商根据交易指令的类型来设定买卖价差，在均衡条件下，由于有竞争做市商的存在，买入报价是做市商收到卖出指令时关于资产价值的条件期望值，卖出报价是做市商收到买入交易指令时关于资产价值的条件期望值，因而交易者的交易指令将促使做市商调整其买卖报价，这种调整从本质上是一种贝叶斯学习过程。Easley和O'Hara(1987)在Milgrom模型的基础上考察了交易规模对做市商价格行为的影响，其结论是做市商的定价策略会依赖指令的规模，数量比较大的指令往往以比较差的价格成交。以后Easley和O'Hara(1992)又考察了交易时间对价格行为的影响，发现交易时间会影响价格，并且交易间隔影响交易价差的大小。现代金融理论方法经过近一个世纪的发展，取得了许多重大突破，特别是进入80年代以后，越来越多的金融难题得到解释。但是由于金融市场的复杂性，至今对许多问题的解释还很难令人满意，例如：对P/E比率和P/B比率对资产价值的影响的现象至今还没有合理的解释，对IPO以及基金中的折价现象的研究结果也没有较为统一的认识，另外市场中是否存在信息操纵问题也是一个争论的焦点。对这些问题的研究与解释，将进一步推动金融理论的发展。

Interest rate marketability and our country State-owned Commercial bank countermeasureInterest rate marketability connotationThe so-called interest rate marketability, is refers to the money market fund supply and demand both sides independent determination interest rate level interest rate decision mechanism vicissitude process 。Says specifically, the interest rate marketability is refers to the Central Bank to need to regulate the datum interest rate according to the monetary policy, various commercial bank saves the loan interest rate according to the fund market supply and demand change independent adjustment, Finally forms take Central Bank datum interest rate as the guidance, multi-level, can manifest fund supply and demand condition and the reflection Central Bank monetary policy intention interest rate operational mechanism fully。The interest rate marketability emphasis interest rate really reflected the fund cost and the supply-demand relation, effectively display its economical leverage nimbly。一. Our country interest rate marketability reform existence questionIs opposite says in the Chinese economic reform and the opening to the outside world overall step, the interest rate marketability reform progresses slowly. Looked on the present situation that, our country not yet completely realizes the interest rate marketability, the interest rate control creates the interest rate this important price release lever to receive the serious restraint in the resources disposition aspect function, the interest rate structure distortion. Our country interest rate system marketability degree quite is also low, mainly displays in following several aspects:1. The interest rate control degree is high, the interest rate level and the structure are incompatible, and the bank independency is restricted. The current our country interest rate policy movement environment controls the interest rate primarily, the interest rate level decision, the difference interest rate policy making and so on the related interest rate each aspect policy all by the government strict control, displays the high planning and closeness.2. The interest rate level determination has certain subjective blindness; the rate adjustment flexibility is insufficient. At present our country interest rate level decision is makes by the monetary policy committee, the interest rate decision-making power high degree of concentration in the central authorities, the interest rate formulation and the adjustment has the serious time lag effect.3. Lacks the effective market datum interest rate. On November 1, 2003, the NAP Standing Committee Cheng Sewer, vice chairman of the Forum, said: "The market-oriented interest rates, the key is to set the benchmark interest rate. The benchmark interest rate is determined, in order to determine the interest rate structure, risk structure. No established the benchmark rate, the interest rate market is a empty sentences. "Benchmark rate in the entire interest rate system has played a core role and prevents other interest rates, in a sense, the benchmark interest rate options and determine the interest rate market is the core of the reform steps.二．Implements the interest rate marketability state-owned commercial bank significanceFirst, is advantageous to the expansion state-owned commercial bank right of autonomous management, the enhancement competitive power. After the interest rate lets loose, the bank had the independent fixed price power, may use this kind of right to independence and its flexible full display fully. The various countries' reform experience indicated that, after the interest rate marketability, the deposit real interest rate all has the different scope raise. The real interest rate rise will have the positive influence to the deposit, the attraction fund from bank systems and so on the stock market, black market accepts the human bank system, the enhancement commercial bank's competitive power. Next, is advantageous in raises the state-owned commercial bank management level. The interest rate marketability causes the fund price to let loose truly. Price competition between the banks presents the new ball game from this. But the price competition must rise take the low cost fund as the backing. In order to gain the low cost capital source, various bank in the financial product, the marketing strategy, service method general unfolds manager respectively, this will intensify inevitably the competition intense degree, will urge the bank change management way, who will grasp is initiative who to be able to obtain market (In the new situation, the commercial bank guild cared about the interest rate market change situation and the international interest rate undulation tendency, and according to own situation, determines the cost scientifically, formulates the price reasonably, the enhancement economic accounting, strengthens its profit ability. It can be said that, the interest rate marketability reform, the interest rate production mechanism transformation, is to a commercial bank management and operation from inside to outside comprehensive forging. Is once more advantageous in creates a relatively fair competition environment. The interest rate marketability and the money market consummation is a process which complements one another. The developed money market is the interest rate marketability reliable guarantee. Because in the developed consummation money market, the financial tool type is rich, financial main body multi-dimensional, the financing way is diverse, the competition is full, the interest rate can reflect fully the fund price, can guide the resources reasonable disposition, enhances the resources use efficiency. Otherwise, the interest rate marketability can promote the money market development consummation; The money market is the interest rate marketability advancement beginning, also will be carries on the risk management to the interest rate the place, the interest rate system change promotes the money market development. Finally, is advantageous in speeds up the microscopic main body the property right reform, interest rate marketability important condition is the state-owned enterprise and the state-owned commercial bank's property right must be clear. The property right is not clear, is not strong to the interest intrinsic budget restraint, exceeds the time limit the risk responsibility to attenuate, and cannot be keen to the interest rate reflection. At present, our country State-owned Commercial bank and very big part of state-owned enterprise's property right slurred, the interest rate market changed into its reform to provide the power, on objective impelled their property right reform.三．The interest rate marketability causes the state-owned commercial bank faced with to challenge sternlyThe interest rate marketability, is the historical stage which our country Commercial bank must pass through, can impel our country State-owned Commercial bank enormously the reform. But after the interest rate marketability, the interest rate level change does not decide, Our country Commercial bank which survives under the control possibly can develop the new financial tool for a long time to dodge the interest rate risk without enough time, will certainly to face the stern challenge, this displays in:1．Has enlarged the bank rate risk. After the interest rate marketability, the interest rate level ascension and the irregular undulation enlarge, intensified the bank vulnerability, ha have enlarged the bank rate risk. After the interest rate marketability, the interest rate level ascension and the irregular undulation enlarge, intensified the bank vulnerability, have the possibility to cause the bank crisis extremely the occurrence. As a result of our country long-term interest rate control, the interest rate by artificial force down, after the interest rate is let loose, the interest rate level can elevate inevitably. The analysis indicated that, in the credit activity, along with the real interest rate enhancement, the risk borrower more will become the bank by chance the customer, But loathes the risk originally the enterprise borrowers also favor in change oneself project the nature, enable it to have a higher risk and the income level. The cause property average horizontal drop in quality, the credit risk increases.Moreover, from looked for a long time that, the interest rate change the fund supply and demand real-time influence, can undulate frequently, but the interest rate undulation namely meant risk existence. How forecast accurately the interest rate change tendency, the reasonable determination has the competitive advantage price water; how assigns scientifically saves, the loan deadline layout, maintains the best advantage bad level;How forecast accurately the interest rate change tendency, the reasonable determination has the competitive advantage price water � How assigns scientifically saves, the loan deadline layout, maintains the best advantage bad level; How adjusts the property debt structure nimbly,Enhances prepares pays the level, the active control interest rate forms fluid wind �? How will supervise perfectly restricts the mechanism, prevented has human sentiment interest rate risk and so on, these will all cause the commercial bank faced with the stern test.2．Leads the service to the commercial bank to have the huge impact. Along with the interest rate marketability, various bank launches the intense contention superiority customer to save the loan war inevitably, the keen competition will cause to save the loan advantage difference large scale deflation. At the same time, the interest rate marketability impetus money market development, the massive enterprise temporary fund no longer rises in value through the deposit form, but is in the capital market, the money market puts in obtains the short-term to receive；Whether there is does the inhabitant also no longer excessively regard as important only contains the risk value deposit interest rate, pays attention contains the risk value the money market to receive �? The bank leadership service will be under the huge impact.It can be said, after interest rate marketability, bank true competition magic weapon instead outside interest rate method. Because the monetary fund is highly the homogeneity commodity, the grade of service is more important, highly effective, the low cost manages finances the service enable the customer to have a higher income, has the attraction to the customer.3．Proposed the challenge to the bank management and operation.Under interest rate control system, regardless of is the interest rate level or counts the rest method all to have the country to decide, regardless of how the country does adjust saves the loan interest rate, all fully considered commercial bank actual situation, maintains the reasonable advantage bad level throughout. Commercial bank's interest rate management is extremely simple, so long as gives according to the People's Bank the fluctuation scope carries out the national interest rate level then, the interest rate change is limited, the interest rate risk is controllable. In such situation, the bank management is inevitably passive. But in under the interest rate marketability condition, the intense market competition forces the bank either to use the price method, through raises the deposit interest rate, reduces the loan interest rate to attract the customer; Either depends upon the high quality service, through the function innovation, the product innovation, the technological innovation satisfies the customer. But this request commercial bank changes present the management, the method and the organization system.4．Proposed the challenge to the commercial bank staff quality. Along with interest rate marketability reform advancement quickening, the interest rate risk enlarge, will strengthen to the future interest rate trend analyzes and forecast oneself will be very urgent. The state-owned commercial bank seeks the financial professional who needs one batch of this aspect high quality, not only these people must have the deep theory foundation of basic skills, but also must have the rich commercial bank practice experience, Both must thoroughly understand the domestic interest rate change the undulation condition, and must be skilled in the forecast interest rate change tendency. But the present state-owned bank lacks generally can promptly effectively the control and the circumvention interest rate risk tool and the interest rate risk management professional, to the interest rate trend development forecast, the risk recognition and control is weak.四．The state-owned commercial bank should to strategyAlong with the interest rate marketability advancement, the interest rate is more and more big to the state-owned commercial bank's influence, in this situation, the state-owned commercial bank should seek positively should to the strategy.1．Establishment finance product fixed price system. In the interest rate marketability situation, whether does the commercial bank draw up a science reasonable fixed price system, has the nimble effective quoted price ability, the realization risk �? Between 20 income balances,Is key which whether it does develop continually. In this process, must establish the effective comprehensive income reckoning system, the overall evaluation customer comprehensive income which brings to the commercial bank，The customer credit risk size, the loan deadline length is the interest rate risk size, as well as commercial bank's collection fund cost and the operation cost share and so on the aspect questions。2．Increases the middle service product development ability, the adjustment profit structure. After the interest rate marketability, the bank saves, the loan favorable difference reduces, the profit level reduces, and this request state-owned commercial bank must develop the middle service vigorously. The bank may while develop positively receives on another's behalf, pays on another's behalf and so on service, uses the commercial bank market main body qualifications fully, positively provides the proxy for other financial organ to distribute the bond, the silver card account transfer, the proxy insures, the fund trust, the broker manages finances, The property management, financial consultant, the investment consultation and so on, enhances the middle service to buy a girl child, on own initiative develops the low risk, the high income middle service new variety positively, promotes the bank large scale by this profit ability, promotes the bank sustainable development.3．Establishes nimbly, the highly effective interest rate management organization, trains the interest rate managerial talent vigorously. According to the Bethel bank supervising and managing committee about the bank effective supervising and managing core principle request, under the interest rate marketability environment, various commercial bank must set up the specialized interest rate risk management department, manages and instructs the entire good interest rate work, Coordinates and coordinates inside and outside the bank to be connected the work. The interest rate control section's most important task is carries on the comprehensive interest rate sensitive tube on the bank asset debt level ; Exterior determination, internal advantage � The definite general headquarters to branch office's interest rate authorization, are responsible for staff interest rate risk management training and so on. In addition, but also should establish the high interest rate information communication channel, after the interest rate marketability, the commercial bank interior enhances greatly about the interest rate information transmission effectiveness, guarantees can transmit promptly general headquarters formulation each interest rate to commercial bank's any business mesh point, guarantees the commercial bank interest rate policy the unity.4．Speeds up the state-owned commercial bank the property right reform. Stipulated according to "Law of corporation" that, the commercial bank belongs to the competitive profession, does not need to adopt the state-owned sole ownership property right, and does not have the legal barrier to its joint stock system transformation. To the state-owned commercial bank's property right reform, its concrete transformation form establishes the joint stock system commercial bank. The reality in China, in accordance with international practice, and gradually achieve solely by the state to transform the state-owned holding company, and ultimately joint-stock limited companies, and establish corporate system of corporate governance institutions, the establishment of the right to operate, ownership and the right to supervise the separation of the framework, China's commercial banks to become real significance of commercial banks, do business operations.字太多，发布下，你再见个问题吧，我回答。率市场化与我国国有商业银行对策利率市场化的内涵所谓利率市场化，是指金融市场资金供求双方自主确定利率水平的利率决定机制的变迁过程。具体讲，利率市场化是指中央银行根据货币政策的需要调控基准利率，各商业银行根据资金市场的供求变化自主调节存贷款利率，最终形成以中央银行基准利率为引导，多层次、能够充分体现资金供求状况和反映中央银行货币政策意图的利率运行机制。利率市场化强调利率真实地反映资金成本与供求关系，灵活有效地发挥其经济杠杆作用.