国外商业银行信用风险研究论文

Interim Measures on Information Disclosure of Commercial Banks Order of the People's Bank of ChinaMay 15, 2002 Chapter I General Provisions Article 1 These rules are formulated on the basis of "Law on the People's bank of China of the People's Republic of China" and "Commercial Banking Law of the People's Bank of China", which aim to strengthen market discipline of commercial banks, standardize information disclosure of commercial banks, effectively safeguard legitimate interests of depositors and other stakeholders and promote safe, sound and efficient operation of commercial banks. Article 2 These rules are to be applied to commercial banks that are established legally within the territory of the People's Republic of China, including domestic commercial banks, wholly foreign funded banks, joint venture banks and branches of foreign banks. Article 3 Commercial banks should disclose information according to these rules, which are the minimum requirements for commercial banks' information disclosure. While abiding by these rules, commercial banks can disclose more information than what has been required by these rules at their own addition to these rules, listed commercial banks should also conform to relevant information disclosure rules published by regulatory body of the securities industry. Article 4 Information disclosure of commercial banks should be proceeded consistent with laws and regulations, the uniform domestic accounting rules and relevant rules of the PBC. Article 5 Commercial banks should disclose information in a standardized fashion, while ensuring authenticity, accuracy, integrity and comparability. Article 6 Annual financial statements disclosed by commercial banks should be subject to auditing by accounting firms that are certified to be engaged in finance-related auditing. Article 7 The People's Bank of China is to supervise commercial banks' information disclosure according to relevant laws and regulations. Chapter II Information to be Disclosed Article 8 Commercial banks should disclose financial statements, and information on risk management, corporate governance and big events of the year according to these rules. Article 9 Commercial banks' financial statements should include accounting report, annex and notes to this report and description of financial position. Article 10 Accounting report disclosed by commercial banks should include balance sheet, statement of income (profit and loss account), statement of owner's equity and other additional charts. Article 11 Commercial banks should indicate inconsistence between the basis of preparation and the basic preconditions of accounting in their notes to the accounting report. Article 12 Commercial banks should explain in their notes to the accounting report the important policy of accounting and accounting estimates, including: Accounting standards, accounting year, reporting currency, accounting basis and valuation principles; Type and scope of loans; Accounting rules for investment; Scope and method of provisions against asset losses; Principle and method of income recognition; Valuation method for financial derivatives; Conversion method for foreign currency business and accounting report; Preparation method for consolidated accounting report; Valuation and depreciation method for fixed assets; Valuation method and amortization policy for intangible assets; Amortization policy for long-term deferred expenses; Accounting practice for income tax. Article 13 Commercial banks should indicate in their notes to the accounting report crucial changes of accounting policy and estimates, contingent items and post-balance sheet items, transfer and sale of important assets. Article 14 Commercial banks should indicate in their annex and notes to the accounting report the total volume of related party transactions and major related party transactions. Major related party transactions refer to those with trading volume exceeding 30 million yuan or 1% of total net assets of the commercial bank. Article 15 Commercial banks should indicate in their notes to the accounting report detailed breakdown of key categories in the accounting report, including: (1) Due from banks by the breakdown of domestic and overseas markets. (2) Interbank lending by the breakdown of domestic and overseas markets. (3) Outstanding balance of loans at the beginning and the end of the accounting year by the breakdown of credibility loans, committed loans, collateralized loans and pledged loans. (4) Non-performing loans at the beginning and end of the accounting year resulted from the risk-based loan classification. (5) Provisions for loan losses at the beginning and the end of the accounting year, new provisions, returned provisions and write-offs in the accounting year. General provisions, specific provisions and special provisions should be disclosed separately. (6) Outstanding balance and changes of interest receivables. (7) Investment at the beginning and the end of the accounting year by instruments. (8) Interbank borrowing in domestic and overseas markets. (9) Calculation, outstanding balance and changes of interest payables. (10) Year-end outstanding balance and other details of off-balance sheet categories, including bank acceptance bills, external guarantees, letters of guarantee for financing purposes, letters of guarantee for non-financing purposes, loan commitments, letters of credit (spot), letters of credit (forward), financial futures, financial options, etc. (11) Other key categories. Article 16 Commercial banks should disclose in their notes to the accounting report status of capital adequacy, including total value of risk assets, amount and structure of net capital, core capital adequacy ratio and capital adequacy ratio. Article 17 Commercial banks should disclose auditing report provided by the appointed accounting firms. Article 18 Description of financial position should cover the general performance of the bank, generation and distribution of profit and other events that have substantial impact on financial position and performance of the bank. Article 19 Commercial banks should disclose following risks and risk management details: (1) Credit risk. Commercial banks should disclose status of credit risk management, credit exposure, credit quality and earnings, including business operations that generate credit risks, policy of credit risk management and control, organizational structure and division of labor in credit risk management, procedure and methods of classification of asset risks, distribution and concentration of credit risks, maturity analysis of over-due loans, restructuring of loans and return of assets. (2) Liquidity risk. Commercial banks should disclose relevant parameters that can represent their status of liquidity, analyze factors affecting liquidity and indicate their strategy of liquidity management. (3) Market risk. Commercial banks should disclose risks brought by changes of interest rates and exchange rate on the market, analyzing impacts of such changes on profitability and financial positions of the bank and indicating their strategy of market risk management. (4) Operation risk. Commercial banks should disclose risks brought by flaws and mistakes of internal procedures, staff and system or by external shocks and indicate the integrity, rationality and effectiveness of their internal control mechanism. (5) Other risks. Other risks that may bring severe negative impact to the bank. Article 20 Commercial banks should disclose following information on corporate governance: (1) Shareholders' meeting during the year. (2) Members of the board of directors and its work performance. (3) Members of the board of supervisors and its work performance. (4) Members of the senior management and their profiles. (5) Layout of branches and function departments. Article 21 Chronicle of events disclosed by commercial banks in the year should at least include the following contents: (1) Names of the ten biggest shareholders and changes during the year. (2) Increase or decrease of registered capital, splitting up and merger. (3) Other important information that is necessary for the general public to know. Article 22 Information of foreign bank branches is to be collected and disclosed by the primary reporting bank branches don't need to disclose information that is only mandated and required for disclosure by institutions with legal person bank branches should translate into Chinese and disclose the summary of information disclosed by their head offices. Article 23 Commercial banks need not disclose information of unimportant categories. However, if the omission or misreporting of certain categories or information may change or affect the assessment or judge of the information users, commercial banks should regarded the categories as key information categories and disclose them. Chapter III Management of Information Disclosure Article 24 Commercial banks should prepare in Chinese their annual reports with all the information to be disclosed and publish them within 4 month after the end of each accounting year. If they are not able to disclose such information on time due to special factors, they should apply to the People's Bank of China for delay of disclosure at least 15 days in advance. Article 25 Commercial banks should submit their annual reports to the People's Bank of China prior to disclosure. Article 26 Commercial banks should make sure that their shareholders and stakeholders could obtain the annual reports on a timely banks should put their annual reports in their major operation venue, so as to ensure such reports are readily available for the general public to read and check. The PBC encourage commercial banks to disclose main contents of their annual reports to the public through media. Article 27 Boards of directors in commercial banks are responsible for the information disclosure. If there is no board of directors in the bank, the president (head) of the bank should assume such a of directors and presidents (heads) of commercial banks should ensure the authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the disclosed information and take legal responsibility for their commitments. Article 28 Commercial banks and their involved staff that provide financial statements with false information or concealing important facts should be punished according to the " Rules on Punishment of Financial Irregularities".Accounting firms and involved staff that provide false auditing report should be punished according to the "Interim Measures on Finance-related Auditing Business by Accounting Firms". Chapter IV Supplementary Provisions Article 29 Commercial banks with total assets below RMB 1 billion or with total deposits below RMB 500 million are exempted from the compulsory information disclosure. However, the People's Bank of China encourages such commercial banks to disclose information according to these rules. Article 30 The People's Bank of China is responsible for the interpretation of these rules. Article 31 These rules shall enter into force as of the date of promulgation and are to be applied to all commercial banks except city commercial commercial banks should adopt these rules gradually from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2006.中国人民银行令[2002]第6号2002年5月15日第一章 总 则 第一条 为加强商业银行的市场约束，规范商业银行的信息披露行为，有效维护存款人和相关利益人的合法权益，促进商业银行安全、稳健、高效运行，依据《中华人民共和国中国人民银行法》、《中华人民共和国商业银行法》等法律法规，制定本办法。 第二条 本办法适用于在中华人民共和国境内依法设立的商业银行，包括中资商业银行、外资独资银行、中外合资银行、外国银行分行。 第三条 商业银行应按照本办法规定披露信息。本办法规定为商业银行信息披露的最低要求。商业银行可在遵守本办法规定基础上自行决定披露更多信息。上市商业银行除应遵守本办法规定披露信息外，还应遵守证券监督管理机关有关信息披露的规定。 第四条 商业银行披露信息应当遵守法律法规、国家统一的会计制度和中国人民银行的有关规定。 第五条 商业银行应遵循真实性、准确性、完整性和可比性的原则，规范地披露信息。 第六条 商业银行披露的年度财务会计报告须经获准从事金融相关审计业务的会计师事务所审计。 第七条 中国人民银行根据有关法律法规对商业银行的信息披露进行监督。 第二章 信息披露的内容 第八条 商业银行应按照本办法规定披露财务会计报告、各类风险管理状况、公司治理、年度重大事项等信息。 第九条 商业银行财务会计报告由会计报表、会计报表附注和财务情况说明书组成。 第十条 商业银行披露的会计报表应包括资产负债表、利润表（损益表）、所有者权益变动表及其他有关附表。 第十一条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明会计报表编制基础不符合会计核算基本前提的情况。 第十二条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明本行的重要会计政策和会计估计，包括：会计报表编制所依据的会计准则、会计年度、记账本位币、记账基础和计价原则；贷款的种类和范围；投资核算方法；计提各项资产减值准备的范围和方法；收入确认原则和方法；衍生金融工具的计价方法；外币业务和报表折算方法；合并会计报表的编制方法；固定资产计价和折旧方法；无形资产计价及摊销政策；长期待摊费用的摊销政策；所得税的会计处理方法等。 第十三条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明重要会计政策和会计估计的变更；或有事项和资产负债表日后事项；重要资产转让及其出售。 第十四条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中披露关联方交易的总量及重大关联方交易的情况。重大关联方交易是指交易金额在3000万元以上或占商业银行净资产总额1%以上的关联方交易。 第十五条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明会计报表中重要项目的明细资料，包括： （一） 按存放境内、境外同业披露存放同业款项； （二） 按拆放境内、境外同业披露拆放同业款项; （三） 按信用贷款、保证贷款、抵押贷款、质押贷款分别披露贷款的期初数、期末数； （四） 按贷款风险分类的结果披露不良贷款的期初数、期末数； （五） 贷款损失准备的期初数、本期计提数、本期转回数、本期核销数、期末数；一般准备、专项准备和特种准备应分别披露； （六） 应收利息余额及变动情况； （七） 按种类披露投资的期初数、期末数； （八） 按境内、境外同业披露同业拆入款项； （九） 应付利息计提方法、余额及变动情况； （十） 银行承兑汇票、对外担保、融资保函、非融资保函、贷款承诺、开出即期信用证、开出远期信用证、金融期货、金融期权等表外项目，包括上述项目的年末余额及其他具体情况； （十一） 其他重要项目。 第十六条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中披露资本充足状况，包括风险资产总额、资本净额的数量和结构、核心资本充足率、资本充足率。 第十七条 商业银行应披露会计师事务所出具的审计报告。 第十八条 财务情况说明书应当对本行经营的基本情况、利润实现和分配情况以及对本行财务状况、经营成果有重大影响的其他事项进行说明。 第十九条 商业银行应披露下列各类风险和风险管理情况： （一） 信用风险状况。商业银行应披露信用风险管理、信用风险暴露、信贷质量和收益的情况，包括产生信用风险的业务活动、信用风险管理和控制政策、信用风险管理的组织结构和职责划分、资产风险分类的程序和方法、信用风险分布情况、信用风险集中程度、逾期贷款的账龄分析、贷款重组、资产收益率等情况。 （二） 流动性风险状况。商业银行应披露能反映其流动性状况的有关指标，分析影响流动性的因素，说明本行流动性管理策略。 （三） 市场风险状况。商业银行应披露因市场汇率、利率变动而产生的风险，分析汇率、利率的变化对银行盈利能力和财务状况的影响，说明本行的市场风险管理策略。 （四） 操作风险状况。商业银行应披露由于内部程序、人员、系统的不完善或失误，或外部事件造成的风险，并对本行内部控制制度的完整性、合理性和有效性作出说明。 （五） 其他风险状况。其他可能对本行造成严重不利影响的风险因素。 第二十条 商业银行应披露下列公司治理信息： （一） 年度内召开股东大会情况； （二） 董事会的构成及其工作情况； （三） 监事会的构成及其工作情况； （四） 高级管理层成员构成及其基本情况； （五） 银行部门与分支机构设置情况。 第二十一条 商业银行披露的本行年度重要事项，至少应包括下列内容： （一） 最大十名股东名称及报告期内变动情况； （二） 增加或减少注册资本、分立合并事项； （三） 其他有必要让公众了解的重要信息。 第二十二条 外国银行分行的信息由主报告行汇总后披露。外国银行分行无须披露本办法规定的仅适用于法人机构的信息。外国银行分行应将其总行所披露信息摘要译成中文后披露。 第二十三条 商业银行无须披露非关键性项目。但若遗漏或误报某个项目或信息会改变或影响信息使用者的评估或判断时，商业银行应将该项目视为关键性项目予以披露。 第三章 信息披露的管理 第二十四条 商业银行应将信息披露的内容以中文编制成年度报告，于每个会计年度终了后的四个月内披露。因特殊原因不能按时披露的，应至少提前十五日向中国人民银行申请延迟。 第二十五条 商业银行应将年度报告在公布前报送中国人民银行。 第二十六条 商业银行应确保股东及相关利益人能及时获取年度报告。商业银行应将年度报告置放在商业银行的主要营业场所，确保公众能方便、及时地查阅。中国人民银行鼓励商业银行通过媒体向公众披露年度报告的主要信息。 第二十七条 商业银行董事会负责本行的信息披露。未设立董事会的，由行长（单位主要负责人）负责。商业银行的董事会、行长（单位主要负责人）应当保证所披露的信息真实、准确、完整，并就其保证承担相应的法律责任。 第二十八条 对在信息披露中提供虚假的或者隐瞒重要事实的财务会计报告的商业银行及有关责任人员，按照《金融违法行为处罚办法》予以处理。对出具虚假审计报告的会计师事务所及有关责任人员，按照《会计师事务所从事金融相关审计业务暂行办法》予以处理。 第四章 附 则 第二十九条 资产总额低于10亿元人民币或存款余额低于5亿元人民币的商业银行，可免于披露信息。中国人民银行鼓励此类商业银行按照本办法规定披露信息。 第三十条 本办法由中国人民银行负责解释。 第三十一条 本办法自公布之日起在除城市商业银行以外的商业银行范围内施行。城市商业银行自2003年1月1日起到2006年1月1日分步施行本办法。只有一篇

一、 CreditMetrics模型的基本框架� 对于CreditMetrics模型而言,影响信贷资产价值的因素即有违约事件,也有信贷资产质量的变化。为获得所有信贷资产的潜在变化信息,CreditMetrics模型采取了盯市(Marked-to-Market)的方法来计算信用风险值。该模型构造了一个模拟信贷资产所有潜在变化以及违约波动的组合计量框架。图1给出了模型的框架,从CreditMetrics模型技术框架看,该模型主要包括三个关键环节:� 1.敞口或内部头寸。头寸数据通常都保存在金融机构一系列的系统当中,包括投资组合数据、交易账簿数据以及表外项目数据等。只要头寸数据的基础是一致的,CreditMetrics就能区分出不同投资种类之间的风险差别。� 2.信用事件所导致的单个敞口的价值波动。信用事件包括违约事件以及评级变动。在计算整个组合的信用风险之前,需要先计算单个头寸的信用风险。计算的风险应能囊括信贷资产在所有各种可能的评级状态下(包括违约)的价值分布。� 3.不同信贷资产彼此变化的相关性。CreditMetrics最终的目的是要计算整个信贷组合的信用风险,为此必须要估计不同资产之间的变化相关性,包括违约的相关性和评级转移的相关性。在估计组合的信贷资产风险值方面,相关性估计至关重要。� 为便于理解,我们将上述步骤分解以下几个重要环节。(1)设定风险期的长度。遵循风险计量的习惯,CreditMetrics将风险期设为1年。(2)设定信用风险评级系统。每个债务人都必须被赋予一个信用评级,评级来源可以是公认的外部结果,也可以是内部评级结果。(3)设定信用评级转移矩阵,转移矩阵给出了债务人在风险期从当前评级状态转移至其他所有评级状态的概率或可能性。(4)设定信贷利差溢价。信贷利差溢价等于当前价格与相同期限无风险利率之间的差额。计算出所有信用评级级别债券的信贷利差溢价,以对应的远期利率为折现率,进一步计算出债券在所有这些评级上现值。(5)设定债券的违约损失率。(6)如果不存在相关性,通过上述步骤计算出的所有债券的价值的分布加起来,所得即整个信贷组合的价值分布。(7)考虑到相关性,估计资产之间的变化相关性。()8估计资产之间的联合违约概率以及联合转移概率,计算组合的信用风险值。� 二、CreditMetrics模型信用度量方法� CreditMetrics模型度量是以信用评级转移为基础的,而信用评级并不只是由CreditMetrics集团提供的,可由用户独立开发,也可以从信用评级机构取得。典型的转移计算是:在一年的时间内,以标准普尔的评级AAA、AA、A、BBB、BB、B和CCC为基础,计算从一个评级转移到另一个评级的转移概率。除了以上7个信用评级外,还考虑表示“违约”的吸收状况D,共计8种状态。根据已知历史数据估计的转移概率,用公司的债券市场或股票市场数据替代公司资产价值直接导出评级分类的相关性,CreditmMetrics计算贷款的组合的价值远期分布,直接估计一般信用损失分布对应某个置信水平分位数作为资产信用风险值。� 1.单一债券或贷款情况� CreditMetrics模型信用度量方法是以信用评级为基础,通过求单项贷款价值概率分布来确定单项贷款的风险。这个概率分布的特点在于它完全基于信用转移分析,即在既定时间内(一般取一年)一种信用质量变为另一种信用质量的概率,用它来度量将来(比如说一年以后)贷款资产组合的价值分布,模型强调资产组合价值变化与信用评级转移相关。假设一笔固定利率、不可提前偿还的中长期贷款。该笔贷款是等额偿还,直到最后一次偿还时结清贷款本息。在不可提前偿还假定条件下,根据普通年金现值一般公式,可推导出偿还贷款额现值计算的基本模型:� 2.组合债券或贷款情况� (1)公司价值模型 � 下面介绍信用计量模型所用的公司价值的基本原则——阈值方法。按照默顿模型,公司资产价值遵循标准几何布朗运动,在时刻的公司价值服从对数正态分布,并可表示为:� (2)联合评级概率的推导� 为了在联合概率中考虑相关性,利用上面计算每笔贷款或新发行债券的阈值,再根据二元正态分布计算出联合概率。我们以初始评级为BBB和A级的公司为例,假设每个公司的资产价值正规化后对数收益r��BBB�和r�A服从标准正态分布,则联合正态分布的密度函数为:� 三、基于CreditMetrics模型的信贷资产风险值的计算实例� 1.单一贷款或债券情况下的信用风险估值� 我们运用上述CreditMetrics模型方法计算单一情况下的信贷资产的风险值。下面以一笔年利率为6%,金额为10 000元,期限为5年,高级未担保的BBB级不可提前偿还的中长期贷款为例来计算CreditMetrics模型的信贷资产风险值。� 第一步,确立转移矩阵。转移矩阵意味着一年内从一个信用等级转变为另一个信用等级的概率,穆迪和标准普尔等级均有这样的数据积累(见表1)。� 与一年期转移矩阵相对应,还有多年期累计平均违约率统计数据(见表2)。� 第二步,确立时间段。CreditMetrics模型中时间选取通常定为一年,这是出于会计数据和财务报告得到的频率而定的。� 第三步,确立远期定价模型。信贷资产的估计可以从与贷款发行方评级对应的信贷资产得出。每个信用级别一年远期零曲线见表3。�� 如果对每一级别重复同样计算,可以得到一年后不同级别贷款的价值,见表4。� 第四步,得出将来组合价值变化的分布。如果发生违约,根据优先偿还程度,投资者可以得到部分清偿,本例题中,高级末担保贷款的清偿率约为(数据来源于Carty and Lieberman(1996)),10 000元的清偿额为5 113美元。信贷资产质量变化产生的一年期的债券价值变化的分布(见表5)。� 假设该笔BBB级贷款价值V服从正态分布,设贷款价值的均值为μ,标准差为σ,则 : 我们可得出BBB贷款的价值表,见表6。� 因此, 在正态分布下,该笔BBB级贷款的信用风险估值如下:� 99%置信度的VaR=×299=697(元)� 95%置信度的VaR=×299=493(元)� 计算结果表明,在贷款价值为正态分布的假设条件下,该笔贷款有1%的可能性在第二年的损失超过697元,有5%的可能性在第二年的损失超过493元。反过来说,该笔贷款在第二年的损失有99%的可能性保证不超过697元,有95%的可能性保证不超过493元。

关于商业银行信贷风险管理的研究论文从经济风险及银行信贷风险管理的一般理论出发，阐明经济风险是现代市场经济的基本特征之一，而银行信贷风险是整个经济风险的集中反映。风险的本质在于收益与损失的可能性并存，因而对经济主体有激励效应与约束效应。商业银行经营的本质就是在风险的这种双重效应的制衡下，回避与防范风险，使风险降到自身可接受的程度，同时获取尽可能大的利润。由于信贷业务在银行经营及经济运行中的重要地位，银行的信贷风险控制就具有了特别重要的意义。目前，西文经济学界运用信息不对称理论，对银行信贷风险产生的原因， 已取得共识，即信息不对称下的逆选择和道德风险以及信息不完全的客观风险。文章还讨论了信贷风险管理与商业银行资产负债比例管理、资本充足率管理、内部控制的关系；并澄清了信贷风险管理认识上的一些误区。以上内容构成了本文的第一章。 文章的第二章首先比较了各种外部组织形式与风险管理效率的关系，指出外部组织形式并非影响信贷管理效率的决定性因素，而内部组织结构才是其中的关键因素。设计信贷风险管理组织结构的重点在于形成各部门之间的横向牵制和各级分支机构的纵向控制机制。西方商业银行经过长期经营发展，内部组织结构逐渐固化为三大功能块：市场块、操作块、管理块，分别行使市场开拓、业务操作、集中管理的职能，三者相互牵制、相互配合。这种组织设计思想体现在信贷业务上，就是审、贷、查三程序在组织结构上的彻底分离，即公司业务部、信贷评审部、风险管理部分别实施贷前调查、贷中审查、贷后检查职能，并且三个部门分别属于不同功能块，以此实现部门间的横向牵制。纵向控制主要是通过贷款决策权在上、下级机构之间进行分配实现的，即对集权型决策与分权型决策的选择；同时也包括在同一机构内，贷款决策权在个人与集体之间的分配，即对个人决策权与集体决策权的选择。文章用运组织管理学的基本原理，详细讨论了这两组共四种决策体制的优劣，指出单纯使用上述任何一种决策机制都存在明显的缺陷，因此现代商业银行都倾向于将集体决策与个人决策、集权型与分权型结合起来，采取以个人决策及分权为主的贷款审批授权制度。这是实行贷款审批授权制度的理论依据。 本文的第三章着重讨论了信贷风险管理的制度系统及其执行效率。组织控制理论认为，制度是保证组织功能优化及发挥、组织机构稳定的必要条件，因此信贷风险管理的一个根本前提是制定并执行严格科学的管理制度，把信贷风险的控制建立在制度保证的基础上。本章首先结合我国的实际情况，介绍了基准制度——信贷政策，指出我国各商业银行应尽快建立统一、完备的信贷政策，正确划分目标市场区域，确定统一的信贷标准和贷款发放原则，以充分发挥整体竞争实力，降低贷款风险。接着，文章用巴黎国际银行和加拿大皇家银行的实例说明了如何设计相互制约的信贷程序，并讨论了实施审、贷、查三分离制度的意义及原因。其次，引用招商银行的成功范例——弹性授权制阐释了贷款决策授权的原则及审批权限划分标准的确定。在第五节“贷款风险损失责任制”中，笔者提出了一种新的责任追查顺序，即反信贷程序的责任追查顺序，以加强各部门、各环节的相互制约，降低经营风险。本章还详细介绍了贷款风险管理的稽核与评价制度的程序与内容，指出内部稽核的权威性、独立性是保证制度系统有效的一个重要因素。在本章的最后，讨论了信贷风险管理的制度效率与银行经营观念的关系，指出，彻底转变经营观念，注重经营的稳健性和利润的长期性是提高我国银行信贷管理水平的当务之急。 信贷风险管理的技术与方法是信贷风险管理中的技术因素，科学有效的决策技术、信息传输系统是现代信贷风险管理的物质基础。我国信贷风险管理的薄弱点之一就是管理技术与方法的落后，因此本文第四章的主要目的就是通过介绍西方商业银行成熟的管理技术，为提高我国信贷风险管理技术提供一些借鉴。文章着重介绍了信贷风险的主要诱因----过度融资的技术分析方法，并提出了信用限额在实际业务中的测算与分析方法，围绕借款人信用可靠性、违约可能性的评估技术和经营状况变化及破产的介绍了工商贷款资信评分模型、消费信贷的资信评分模型等。在信贷风险管理信息系统中，着重讨论了运用信贷管理信息系统的意义、信贷管理信息系统的设计思想及维护其有效性的措施。最后，本章介绍了信贷风险挽救技术与策略，指出成立专门的风险挽救机构是化解我国巨额不良信贷资产的措施之一。 在第五章中，笔者提出信贷风险管理的核心是对人员的激励与控制的观点。现代管理理论认为一切管理归根结底是对人的管理，对人的行为的管理。信贷风险管理作为一种具体管理，其本质也是对人的管理。在信贷风险管理的四个子系统中，对人员的激励与控制系统居于支配地位，其它三个子系统直接或间接地为管理信贷人员服务。在对人的管理以孰为本的问题上，制度主义与行为主义基于对人性的不同假定，两者观点截然不同。前者强调制度、控制的作用，后者强调人的能动性，认为管理的重点在于从正面诱导员工的积极性、主动性。The thesis sets out from the general theories of economic risks and banking credit risks management, to represent that economic risks are one of basic characters of modern market economy, and the banking credit risks are the focalization of the whole economic risks. The essence of risk is that the possibilities of proceeds and losses exist simultaneously, therefore encouraging meanwhile restricting the activities of main body of the market economy. The essence of commercial banks is to avoid and prevent risks under the balance of dual effects of the risk so that risks can decline to an acceptable degree while proceeds is to be taken in as much as possible. At present, western economic industry has reached a consensus on the reasons of the exposure of banking credit risks by virtue of the information non-symmetry theory that risks stem from the adverse selection under the information non-symmetry and moral risks and objective risks arising from information insufficiency. In addition, this thesis discusses the relations between credit risks management and equity-debt ratio management, capital abundance ratio management and internal control respectively. It also clarifies some misunderstanding on credit risks management. The above-mentioned contents form Chapter One of this thesis. Chapter Two of this thesis first points out that the decisive factor of the efficiency of credit management is not the external organizational form but internal organization structure by comparing the relations between various external organizational forms and the efficiency of risks management. The emphases on designing organizational structure of credit risks management should be laid on the forming of the mechanism of lateral control between different divisions and the mechanism of vertical control on different levels of subsidiaries and affiliates. After long-term development, the internal organizational structure of western commercial banks has been shaped into three functional sections: market section, operation section and administration section, which exercise the functions of marketing, business operation, and centralized administration respectively, and furthermore, control one another, cooperate one another. This kind of idea about organizational design is embodied by the complete organizational division of these three steps of credit examination, approval and investigation in the credit operation that means the departments of business operation, credit examination and risk management, which belong to three different functional sections, respectively perform the functions of research before loan-providing, examination of credit application, and supervision after loan-providing, thereby, the lateral control between different departments can be effected. The vertical control is exercised through both the allotment of credit decision-making power between higher levels and lower levels of business departments that means to choose centralization or decentralization of power, and allotment of credit decision-making power between individuals and collectivity in a department that represents individual or collective decision-making power. This thesis amply discusses the good and bad effect of these four kinds of decision-making systems under two groups by applying the fundamentals of organizational management, thereby indicating that solely using any one of four decision-making systems will bring on visible defects. Accordingly, modern commercial banks mostly intends to adopt the loan examining authorization system which joins the collective and individual decision-making as well as centralization and decentralization together, but giving priority to individual decision and decentralization of power. Chapter Three of this thesis puts emphases on credit risks management system and its executive efficiency. The organizational control theory deems that system is the necessary condition under which organizational functions can be optimized and exerted, meanwhile organizational institution being stabilized,(美)卡尔-约翰·林捷瑞恩(Carl-JohanLindgren)等著; 潘康等译; 银行稳健经营与宏观经济政策[M]. 中国金融出版社, 1997