Half-way from rags to richesApr 24th 2008From The Economist print editionVietnam has made a remarkable recovery from war and penury, says Peter Collins (interviewed here). But can it change enough to join the rich world?EyevineCorrection to this articleKNEES and knuckles scraping the ground, the visitors struggle to keep up with the tour guide who is briskly leading the way through the labyrinth of claustrophobic burrows dug into the hard earth. The legendary Cu Chi tunnels, from which the Viet Cong launched waves of surprise attacks on the Americans during the Vietnam war, are now a popular tourist attraction (pictured above). Visitors from all over the world arrive daily at the site near the city that used to be called Saigon, renamed Ho Chi Minh City after the Communists took the south in the wreckage of an abandoned M41 tank another friendly guide demonstrates a dozen types of improvised booby-traps with sharp spikes that were set in and around the tunnels to maim pursuing American soldiers. The Vietnamese not only welcome the tourist dollars Cu Chi brings in, but are also rather proud of it. They feel it demonstrates their ingenuity, adaptability, perseverance and, above all, their determination to resist much stronger foreign invaders, as the country has done many times down the centuries. These days Vietnam also has plenty of other things to be proud of. In the 1980s Ho Chi Minh's successors as party leaders damaged the war-ravaged economy even more by attempting to introduce real communism, collectivising land ownership and repressing private business. This caused the country to slide to the brink of famine. The collapse soon afterwards of its cold-war sponsor, the Soviet Union, added to the country's deep isolation and cut off the flow of roubles that had kept its economy going. Neighbouring countries were inundated with desperate Vietnamese “boat people”. Since then the country has been transformed by almost two decades of rapid but equitable growth, in which Vietnam has flung open its doors to the outside world and liberalised its economy. Over the past decade annual growth has averaged . Young, prosperous and confident Vietnamese throng downtown Ho Chi Minh City's smart Dong Khoi street with its designer shops. The quality of life is high for a country that until recently was so poor, and its larger cities have retained some of their colonial charm, though choking traffic and constant construction work are beginning to take their toll. An agricultural miracle has turned a country of 85m once barely able to feed itself into one of the world's main providers of farm produce. Vietnam has also become a big exporter of clothes, shoes and furniture, soon to be joined by microchips when Intel opens its $1 billion factory outside Ho Chi Minh City. Imports of machinery are soaring. Exports plus imports equal 160% of GDP, making the economy one of the world's most open. All this has kept government revenues buoyant despite cuts in import tariffs. The recent introduction of company taxes is also helping to fill the government's coffers. Spending on public services has surged, yet public debt, at an acceptable 43% of GDP, has remained fairly stable. Having made peace with its former foes, Vietnam hosted Presidents Bush, Putin and Hu at the Asia-Pacific summit in 2006 and joined the World Trade Organisation in 2007. This year it has one of the rotating seats on the UN Security Council. Vietnam's Communists conceded economic defeat 22 years ago, in the depths of a crisis, and brought in market-based reforms called doi moi (renewal), similar to those Deng Xiaoping had introduced in China a few years earlier. As in China, it took time for the effects to show up, but over the past few years economic liberalisation has been fostering rapid, poverty-reducing World Bank's representative in Vietnam, Ajay Chhibber, calls Vietnam a “poster child” of the benefits of market-oriented reforms. Not only does it comply with the catechism of the “Washington Consensus”—free enterprise, free trade, sensible state finances and so on—but it also ticks all the boxes for the Millennium Development Goals, the UN's anti-poverty blueprint. The proportion of households with electricity has doubled since the early 1990s, to 94%. Almost all children now attend primary school and benefit from at least basic no longer really needs the multilateral organisations' aid. Multilateral and bilateral donors together have promised the country $ billion in loans and grants this year, but with so much foreign investment pouring in, Vietnam's currency reserves increased by almost double that figure last year. At least the aid donors have learned from the mid-1990s, when excessive praise discouraged Vietnam from continuing to reform, prompting an exodus of investors. Now the tone in private meetings with officials is much franker, says a diplomat who attends them. Vietnam has become the darling of foreign investors and multinationals. Firms that draw up a “China-plus-one” strategy for new factories in case things go awry in China itself often make Vietnam the plus-one. Wage costs remain well below those in southern China and productivity is growing faster, albeit from a lower base. When the UN Conference on Trade and Development asked multinationals where they planned to invest this year and next, Vietnam, at number six, was the only South-East Asian country in the top ten. The government's programme of selling stakes in publicly owned firms and exposing them to market discipline has recently gathered pace. At the same time the switch from a command economy to free competition has allowed the Vietnamese people's entrepreneurialism to flourish. Almost every household now seems to be running a micro-business on the side, and a slew of ambitious larger firms is coming to the stockmarket. Much of the praise now being showered anew on the country is deserved. The government is well on course for its target of turning Vietnam into a middle-income country by 2010. Its longer-term aim, of becoming a modern industrial nation by 2020, does not seem unrealistic. But from now on the going may get tougher. As Mr Chhibber notes, few countries escape the “middle-income trap” as they become richer. They tend to lose their reformist zeal and see their growth fizzle. A study in 2006 by the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences concluded that further reductions in poverty will require higher growth rates than in the past because the remaining poor are well below the poverty line, whereas many of those who recently crossed it did not have far to stench of corruptionThe Communist Party leadership openly admits that the Vietnamese public is fed up with the endemic corruption at all levels of public life, from lowly traffic policemen and clerks to the most senior people in ministries. In 2006, just before the party's five-yearly congress, the transport minister resigned and several officials were arrested over a scandal in which millions of dollars of foreign aid were gambled on the outcome of football matches. The leadership insists it is doing its best to clean up, but a lot remains to be as bad as the corruption is the glacial speed of legislative and bureaucratic processes. Proposed laws have to pass through all sorts of hoops before taking effect, with endless rounds of consultations to build consensus. The dividing line between the Communist Party, the government and the courts is not always clear. The justice system is rudimentary. Lawyers have no formal access to past case files, so they find it hard to use precedent in legal government is part-way through a huge project to slim the bureaucracy and streamline official procedures. It recently cut the number of ministries from 28 to 22. Yet for the moment the bureaucratic logjam is stopping the country building the roads, power stations and other public works it needs to maintain its growth rate. Nguyen Tan Dung, the prime minister, says that if growth is to continue at its current rate, the country's electricity-generating capacity needs to double by 2010. That seems a tall order, to put it mildly. Soaring car-ownership is leaving the country's underdeveloped roads increasingly gridlocked. In an admirably liberal attempt to limit price distortions as oil surged above $100 a barrel, the government slashed fuel subsidies in February. But one effect will be to stoke inflation, already worryingly high at in March. Bank lending surged by 38% last year as firms and individuals borrowed to speculate on shares and government is finding it much harder to manage an economy made up of myriad private companies, banks and investors than to issue instructions to a limited number of state institutions, especially as the public sector is currently suffering a drain of talent to private firms that are able to offer much higher pay. What could go wrongAll this leaves Vietnam's continued economic development exposed to a number of risks: • Rising inflation—which is hurting low earners in particular—and a growing shortage of affordable housing could create a new urban underclass among unskilled workers who have left the land for the cities. Combined with rising resentment at official corruption and the increasing visibility of Vietnam's new rich, this could cause social friction and bring strikes and protests, chipping away at the political stability that has underpinned Vietnam's strong growth and investment.• Trade liberalisation and increased domestic competition will benefit some firms and farmers but hurt others—especially inefficient state enterprises. These could join forces and press the government to halt or even reverse the reforms.• The slumping stockmarket or perhaps a property crash could cause a big firm or bank to fail. Given the country's weak and untested bankruptcy laws and financial regulators, the authorities may find it hard to deal with that kind of calamity.• Natural disasters, from bird flu to floods, could cause chaos.• The economy could come up against the limits of its creaking infrastructure and the shortage of people with higher skills. Jammed roads, power blackouts and the inability to fill managerial and professional jobs could all bring Vietnam's growth rate crashing has set itself such demanding standards that even if some combination of these factors did no more than push annual growth below 5%, it would be seen as a serious setback. The foreign minister, Pham Gia Khiem, notes that Vietnam's current growth of around 8-9% is lower than that in Asia's richest economies at the same stage in their development. Despite the risks ahead, Vietnam has already provided the world with an admirable model for overcoming war, division, penury and isolation and growing strongly but equitably to reach middle-income status. This model could be followed by many impoverished African states or, closer to home, perhaps by North Korea. If it can be combined with gradual political liberalisation, it might even offer something for China to think about.
Microeconomics is a branch of economics that studies how individuals, households and firms make decisions to allocate limited resources,[1] typically in markets where goods or services are being bought and sold. Microeconomics examines how these decisions and behaviours affect the supply and demand for goods and services, which determines prices; and how prices, in turn, determine the supply and demand of goods and services.[2][3] Macroeconomics, on the other hand, involves the "sum total of economic activity, dealing with the issues of growth, inflation and unemployment, and with national economic policies relating to these issues"[2] and the effects of government actions (such as changing taxation levels) on them.[4] Particularly in the wake of the Lucas critique, much of modern macroeconomic theory has been built upon 'microfoundations' — . based upon basic assumptions about micro-level behaviour. One of the goals of microeconomics is to analyze market mechanisms that establish relative prices amongst goods and services and allocation of limited resources amongst many alternative uses. Microeconomics analyzes market failure, where markets fail to produce efficient results, as well as describing the theoretical conditions needed for perfect competition. Significant fields of study in microeconomics include general equilibrium, markets under asymmetric information, choice under uncertainty and economic applications of game theory. Also considered is the elasticity of products within the market system. Assumptions and definitions The theory of supply and demand usually assumes that markets are perfectly competitive. This implies that there are many buyers and sellers in the market and none of them have the capacity to significantly influence prices of goods and services. In many real-life transactions, the assumption fails because some individual buyers or sellers or groups of buyers or sellers do have the ability to influence prices. Quite often a sophisticated analysis is required to understand the demand-supply equation of a good. However, the theory works well in simple situations. Mainstream economics does not assume a priori that markets are preferable to other forms of social organization. In fact, much analysis is devoted to cases where so-called market failures lead to resource allocation that is suboptimal by some standard (highways are the classic example, profitable to all for use but not directly profitable for anyone to finance). In such cases, economists may attempt to find policies that will avoid waste directly by government control, indirectly by regulation that induces market participants to act in a manner consistent with optimal welfare, or by creating "missing markets" to enable efficient trading where none had previously existed. This is studied in the field of collective action. It also must be noted that "optimal welfare" usually takes on a Paretian norm, which in its mathematical application of Kaldor-Hicks Method, does not stay consistent with the Utilitarian norm within the normative side of economics which studies collective action, namely public choice. Market failure in positive economics (microeconomics) is limited in implications without mixing the belief of the economist and his or her theory. The demand for various commodities by individuals is generally thought of as the outcome of a utility-maximizing process. The interpretation of this relationship between price and quantity demanded of a given good is that, given all the other goods and constraints, this set of choices is that one which makes the consumer happiest. [edit] Modes of operation It is assumed that all firms are following rational decision-making, and will produce at the profit-maximizing output. Given this assumption, there are four categories in which a firm's profit may be considered. A firm is said to be making an economic profit when its average total cost is less than the price of each additional product at the profit-maximizing output. The economic profit is equal to the quantity output multiplied by the difference between the average total cost and the price. A firm is said to be making a normal profit when its economic profit equals zero. This occurs where average total cost equals price at the profit-maximizing output. If the price is between average total cost and average variable cost at the profit-maximizing output, then the firm is said to be in a loss-minimizing condition. The firm should still continue to produce, however, since its loss would be larger if it were to stop producing. By continuing production, the firm can offset its variable cost and at least part of its fixed cost, but by stopping completely it would lose the entirety of its fixed cost. If the price is below average variable cost at the profit-maximizing output, the firm should go into shutdown. Losses are minimized by not producing at all, since any production would not generate returns significant enough to offset any fixed cost and part of the variable cost. By not producing, the firm loses only its fixed cost. By losing this fixed cost the company faces a challenge. It must either exit the market or remain in the market and risk a complete loss. [edit] Market failure Main article: Market failure In microeconomics, the term "market failure" does not mean that a given market has ceased functioning. Instead, a market failure is a situation in which a given market does not efficiently organize production or allocate goods and services to consumers. Economists normally apply the term to situations where the inefficiency is particularly dramatic, or when it is suggested that non-market institutions would provide a more desirable result. On the other hand, in a political context, stakeholders may use the term market failure to refer to situations where market forces do not serve the public interest. The four main types or causes of market failure are: Monopolies or other cases of abuse of market power where a "single buyer or seller can exert significant influence over prices or output". Abuse of market power can be reduced by using antitrust regulations.[5] Externalities, which occur in cases where the "market does not take into account the impact of an economic activity on outsiders." There are positive externalities and negative externalities.[5] Positive externalities occur in cases such as when a television program on family health improves the public's health. Negative externalities occur in cases such as when a company’s processes pollutes air or waterways. Negative externalities can be reduced by using government regulations, taxes, or subsidies, or by using property rights to force companies and individuals to take the impacts of their economic activity into account. Public goods are goods that have the characteristics that they are non-excludable and non-rivalous and include national defense[5] and public health initiatives such as draining mosquito-breeding marshes. For example, if draining mosquito-breeding marshes was left to the private market, far fewer marshes would probably be drained. To provide a good supply of public goods, nations typically use taxes that compel all residents to pay for these public goods (due to scarce knowledge of the positive externalities to third parties/social welfare); and Cases where there is asymmetric information or uncertainty (information inefficiency).[5] Information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other party. For example, used-car salespeople may know whether a used car has been used as a delivery vehicle or taxi, information that may not be available to buyers. Typically it is the seller that knows more about the product than the buyer, but this is not always the case. An example of a situation where the buyer may have better information than the seller would be an estate sale of a house, as required by a last will and testament. A real estate broker purchasing this house may have more information about the house than the family members of the deceased. This situation was first described by Kenneth J. Arrow in a seminal article on health care in 1963 entitled "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," in the American Economic Review. George Akerlof later used the term asymmetric information in his 1970 work The Market for Lemons. Akerlof noticed that, in such a market, the average value of the commodity tends to go down, even for those of perfectly good quality, because the buyer has no way of knowing whether the product they are buying will turn out to be a "lemon" (a defective product). [edit] Opportunity cost Main article: Opportunity cost Although opportunity cost can be hard to quantify, the effect of opportunity cost is universal and very real on the individual level. In fact, this principle applies to all decisions, not just economic ones. Since the work of the Austrian economist Friedrich von Wieser, opportunity cost has been seen as the foundation of the marginal theory of value. Opportunity cost is one way to measure the cost of something. Rather than merely identifying and adding the costs of a project, one may also identify the next best alternative way to spend the same amount of money. The forgone profit of this next best alternative is the opportunity cost of the original choice. A common example is a farmer that chooses to farm his land rather than rent it to neighbors, wherein the opportunity cost is the forgone profit from renting. In this case, the farmer may expect to generate more profit himself. Similarly, the opportunity cost of attending university is the lost wages a student could have earned in the workforce, rather than the cost of tuition, books, and other requisite items (whose sum makes up the total cost of attendance). The opportunity cost of a vacation in the Bahamas might be the down payment money for a house. Note that opportunity cost is not the sum of the available alternatives, but rather the benefit of the single, best alternative. Possible opportunity costs of the city's decision to build the hospital on its vacant land are the loss of the land for a sporting center, or the inability to use the land for a parking lot, or the money that could have been made from selling the land, or the loss of any of the various other possible uses—but not all of these in aggregate. The true opportunity cost would be the forgone profit of the most lucrative of those listed. One question that arises here is how to assess the benefit of dissimilar alternatives. We must determine a dollar value associated with each alternative to facilitate comparison and assess opportunity cost, which may be more or less difficult depending on the things we are trying to compare. For example, many decisions involve environmental impacts whose dollar value is difficult to assess because of scientific uncertainty. Valuing a human life or the economic impact of an Arctic oil spill involves making subjective choices with ethical implications.
国际经济法是调整国家、国际组织以及不同国家的法人与个人之间在国际经济活动中所产生的国际经济关系的法律规范的总称。下文是我为大家搜集整理的国际经济法的论文参考论文的内容,欢迎大家阅读参考!国际经济法的论文参考论文篇1 论国际法中的经济制裁 在中文中,“制裁”的基本释义是“用强力管束并惩处,使不得胡作非为”。而在英文中,sanction由法令、庄严的协定等含义发展出多种释义:一是从法律角度指为保证法律得到遵守而采取的手段,包括对于违反法律实行的各种惩罚和为了预防违法而采取的奖赏的形式;是从道德的角度指维护道德的约束力;三是从国际法或国际政治的角度指几个国家通常一致采用的一种强制性手段,迫使违反国际法的国家停止违法活动或服从裁决,尤指采取不给贷款、限制双边贸易,或者采取武装干涉或封锁等 措施 。国际经济制裁一般是指一国或多国对另一国或多国所实行的一种经济惩罚,其实质是以制裁为手段达到一定的政治目标及 其它 目标。西方国家直言不讳地宣称,制裁是其推行外交政策的“一种强有力的工具”。联合国有时也以通过某些决议的形式迫使会员国参与集体制裁。20世纪以来,随着经济全球化的加速发展,其使用频率越来越高。据K·A·伊利沃特(K·A·Elliott)和.哈夫波尔(G·C·Hufbauer)对1914年到1998年170件案例的分析,150多件发生在战后50多年的时间里,而在90年代不到10年的时间里就发生了50多件。 通观战后国际经济制裁实例,可以得出所采取的形式主要有三种: 第一种也是应用最普遍的即战略禁运。禁止向被制裁国提供核武器、常规武器和军民两用技术产品,阻止高科技及其产品进入被制裁国;而在通常没有必要进行战略禁运时,一般综合贸易禁运。对被制裁国实行进出口禁运以及资金与人员往来限制。此外还有专项贸易禁运。重点选择关于被制裁国国计民生的若干贸易项目进行禁运。被选择的项目通常是粮食和石油等。 国际经济制裁的特点 首先是强制性。在强度上经济制裁是介于外交手段和军事手段之间的一种手段。制裁方为达到目的,不会顾及被制裁方的感受。 其次是对抗性。制裁者在实施制裁的时候从不掩饰自己所要制裁的对象以及所要达到的目标,这就使得制裁者与被制裁者之间处于一种公开的对抗状态。 此外还有相关性。经济制裁是使双方利益均受损失的双刃剑,而且制裁还会影响到第三国的利益。经济关系越密切,所受的损失就越大。经济制裁的这一特点决定了大多数的制裁难以成功,因为在利益的驱动下,不仅制裁国的公司有可能违背政府意旨而行事,而且制裁联盟的成员国也会各行其事,从而使制裁效果大打折扣。 国际制裁的核心问题是效率问题,即如何以最小的代价,最少的时间达到是对方屈服的目的。伊利沃特等对大量案例的实证分析后发现,经济制裁的成功率在不断下降,1938-1972年间,迫使对方做出让步、达到制裁预定目标的为67%,1973-1990年则下降到22%,即使在90年代,经济制裁的成功率也只有大约1/4。在影响经济制裁效率的因素中,首要的是目标国所承受的经济成本。伊利沃特的统计发现,大多数成功的案例中,制裁所造成的成本超过目标国GDP的2%,而失败的案例中这一比例不到一半。 经济制裁的所造成的损失是要由民众来承担的。一般来说,经济制裁会造成民众的损失,导致民众对政府不满,进而影响政府的决策。这个假设是建立在受制裁政府是民选政府的前提上的。假若被制裁的国家政权不是民选政权,那么制裁的效果值得推敲的。例如像朝鲜这样的国家,政府控制了全部的媒体,民众得到外部消息的唯一来源就是官方消息,在这种情况下,只要稍作煽动,民众对所遭受苦难的痛苦情绪很容易就转化为对制裁方的仇恨。这样不仅达不到发动制裁的目的,反而使受制裁国的政权更加稳固。海湾战争后,联军对伊拉克的制裁一直延续到2003年,大大地削弱了伊拉克的实力,从而为后来的军事行动铺平了道路。但是制裁的最初目的——希望伊拉克人自己反抗来推翻萨达姆政权—无疑是失败的。 经济制裁往往对制裁国自身也会造成很严重的损失。例如二十世纪七十年代美国为了迫使苏联撤离阿富汗,对苏联发动了粮食禁运,随后又发动了油气管道禁运。对苏联的粮食和油气管道禁运严重损害了美国农场主和工业企业以及相关产业的利益,最后在利益集团的压力下,美国后来不得不主动取消了这一制裁。当然这也和阿富汗战争的进程和国际形势的转变有关。美国七八十年代对伊朗和利比亚的资产冻结,既包括保存在美国本土的两国资产,还涉及到美国银行海外分公司及其附属机构中的资产。其实施不仅引起与离岸金融市场所在地的法律冲突,损害到该地的主权和金融界的利益,也损害了美国金融界的利益。 "从更广阔视野看,更重要和攸关美国国家利益的是,客户对美国银行服务能力的信心的丧失,将不可避免地导致这类顾客离开纽约或美国其他市场,到诸于伦敦这类被认为能够提供比较公平环境的外国市场"。据国际经济研究机构在1995年的 报告 称,制裁给美国公司造成的损失在150亿到190亿美元之间,并且影响到约20万工人的就业问题,其结果必然引起相关行业的不满。 至于民主国家之间,政治体制越发成熟,国家间的联系日趋紧密,牵一发而动全身,在这种情况下,很难做出会受到制裁的行为,更不用说去制裁别人了。 所以,有时候,往往制裁不一定给力,直接采用军事手段,才是最有效的 方法 。随着地球上敢于公然进行独裁的国家越来越少,可以预见的是,制裁这种手段,离消失已经不远了。 国际经济制裁的法律地位 一般说起来,国际经济制裁的法律地位包括两个方面:一是制裁国在什么样的情况下有权采用经济制裁。二是制裁国在什么样的程度上有权使用经济制裁。前者系指国际经济制裁的程序性规定,后者即国际经济制裁的实质性规定。 国际上第一个涉及国际经济制裁的公约,是1919年巴黎和会结束时签订的《国际联盟盟约》。该盟约第十六条第一款规定:对于联盟会员国不顾以仲裁解决争端的规定而从事战争者,“应即视为对于所有联盟其它会员国有战争行为。其它各会员国担任立即与之断绝各种商业上或财政Α之关系,禁止其人民与破坏盟约国人民财政上、商业上或个人往来”。这就是说,第一,经济制裁是针对特定的战争行为,该行为一旦发生,其它会员国实行制裁的义务即自动产生;第二制裁是全面、彻底的,是“全面的经济制裁”;第三,不仅会员国,非会员国也得参加经济制裁,因而是“全球性的经济制裁”。 然而,如此严厉的经济制裁的法律规定不久便为国联大会一项关于“经济武器”的决议所取代。这项决议提出:破坏盟约的战争行为是否存在,由各会员国自己决定;国联行政院可对此提出咨询意见,但不能作出约束性的决定。这一修改,限制了国联行政院的权力,加强了各会员国的任意性,削弱了1935年对意大利经济制裁的力量,同时,也为此后单边国际经济制裁的根据留下了伏笔。 同多边制裁和全球性制裁的法律地位相比,单边经济制裁的法律地位则至今尚未明确。一方面,根据国际法的基本原则,一个国家决定同另一个国家建立或断绝经济、贸易往来,纯属该国内政,系该国主权的体现,外界不得干预。西方有些国际法学者还找出前面提到过的国联决议来论证单边经济制裁的合法性。他们提出,由于联合国的无能为力,促进和维持国际和平的任务已经落在各个成员国之上,而各国的主要工具就是经济制裁。 另一方面,国际上也有个趋势,主张对国际经济制裁加以限制。如联大1970年《关于各国依联合国宪章建立友好关系及合作之国际法原则之宣言》和1974年《各国经济权利和义务宪章》(第32条)就曾规定:任何国家均不得使用或鼓励使用经济、政治或任何它种措施强迫另一个国家,以取得该国主权权利行使上之屈从,并自该国获取任何种类之利益。但是,什么是“外国不得干预的主权行为”,什么是“迫使一主权权利行使之屈从”,则各国都有自己的标准,很难达成一致的定论。 目前的习惯国际法是,一国对另一国的经济制裁只要不牵涉军事行动或武装封锁,只要不牵涉它国的司法管辖权(1984年1月美国总统里根宣布扩大对苏联出口石油和天然气设备的禁运范围后,美国就曾同英、法、西德等西欧国家就管辖权问题发生过争执),一般并不会引起别国的非议,当然也不会引起国际法上的国家责任。 参考文献 [1]现代汉语词典,北京,商务印书馆,2002年版第1492页 [2]牛津当代大辞典,广州,世界图书出版公司,1997年版第1644页 [3]国际经济制裁的效率与外部性分析,武汉大学学报,第五十八卷,第三期 [4]HAASS,R. 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ForEign Affairs,1997,76. 国际经济法的论文参考论文篇2 浅析国际经济法视野中的主权基金 [摘要]主权基金是一种全新的专业化、市场化的积极投资模式。从国际经济法视野来看。主权基金对于现代国际经济新秩序的建立发挥着重要作用。主权基金是国际经济法中国家经济主权原则与国际合作发展原则的充分体现,使得全球资本市场更为安全、稳定。从所有权的角度来看,主权基金的兴起也将使世界经济重心从私营部门转向国有部门。因此,主权基金的良性运作与健康发展需要在全世界范围内营造公平互利的法治环境。 [关键词]主权基金国际经济法法治环境 在2009年4月的伦敦G20峰会中。西方各国一再强调中国应在主权基金领域担负起大国的责任。2009年4月18日,中国投资公司董事长楼继伟在博鳌论坛“国际金融体制改革:新兴经济体的作用”分论坛演讲时称,主权财富基金是现存的不合理的货币体系的必然产物。从50年来的历史上看,主权财富基金在市场上没有不良记录,是现代市场经济的稳定性力量。 主权基金(Sovereign Fund)又称主权财富基金,是指掌握在一国政府手中用于对外进行市场化投资的资金,主要来源于国家财政盈余、外汇储备盈余、自然资源出口盈余等,由政府设立专门的投资机构管理。主权基金是一种全新的专业化、市场化的积极投资模式,其投资方向不仅包括股票和其他风险性资产在内的全球性多元化资产组合,也拓展到外国房地产、私人股权投资、商品期货、对冲基金等非传统类投资类别。 主权基金的崛起与经济全球化密切相关。进入21世纪以来,以中国、新加坡、印度等为代表的新兴工业化国家已经实现了经常项目巨额顺差常态化,而这些国家又不希望汇率上升过快,于是外汇储备急速膨胀;此外,以俄罗斯和海湾国家为代表的另一批新兴国家则直接受惠于全球化带来的能源需求激增,在石油价格、矿产品价格居高不下的背景下,凭借国家对资源开发权力的拥有。也积聚了大量国家财富。这些国家具有政府主导的传统,市场运作下的理财工具又不完善,于是财富大量集中在主权基金手中。目前,主权基金已经成为国际金融市场一个日益活跃的参与者,其资金规模已经超过对冲基金和私募基金,市场影响力正不断增强。据统计,1990年全球主权基金的规模仅有约5亿美元;而2007年全球已有36个国家和地区设立了主权基金,资金规模约万亿美元。其中,最大的阿联酋阿布扎比基金规模高达9000亿美元;中国和俄罗斯拥有的主权基金规模也分别达到2000亿和1280亿美元。从发达国家与新兴市场国家双赢的角度考虑,主权财富基金的存在不应被视为一种威胁,只要各国努力规范其行为并改善其透明度和信誉,主权财富基金理应为世界金融市场的稳定作出积极的贡献。 从国际经济法视野来看,主权基金对于现代国际经济新秩序的建立发挥着重要作用。 首先,主权基金是国际经济法中国家经济主权原则的直接体现。该原则规定每个国家对其全部财富、自然资源和经济活动享有永久主权,不受任何外来干涉。而主权基金本身就是一国对经济活动的自主决定权和对自然资源所有权的延伸,属于国家利益的范畴,一国政府对其主权基金享有完全的占有、管理和支配权。主权基金主要来源于属于国有资产的财政盈余、外汇储备和自然资源出口盈余,是国家主权财富在现代国际经济法律关系中的重要表现形式。特别是对于广大发展中国家而言。主权基金不仅是国家经济主权的象征。更是保障其在国际经济活动中获得平等的参与和决策权,进而实现国际经济格局多元化的有力武器。根据美国主权财富基金研究所(Sovereign Wealth Fund Insti-tute)2009年4月发布的数据,截至2008年,中国外汇储备管理局旗下的华安投资管理公司管理资产约为3471亿美元,位居世界第三;中国的另一只主权财富基金――中国投资有限公司以1900亿美元资产排名第八。2004年,具有主权基金背景的联想集团以亿美元成功收购IBM全球Pc业务,在一定程度上扭转了中国在中美高科技贸易中相对弱势的地位,使中国在国际经济活动中获得了更多的话语权。2008年6月,在第四次“中美战略经济对话”宣布正式启动中美双边投资保护协定(BIT)谈判中,美方也明确表态:欢迎来自中国的主权基金,并将在修改投资法时认真考虑中方的立场。 其次,主权基金的积极发展是国际经济法中国际合作与发展原则的充分体现,使得全球资本市场更为安全、稳定。由于主权基金具有相对的稳定性和低风险,当资本市场面临崩溃危机时,投资者不必担心主权基金会陷入恐慌性抛售中,而且大部分主权基金并不像养老基金一样需要定期支付红利,从而避免频繁地在证券市场上套现。因此。主权基金能够成为一个长期战略投资者参与世界各国的区域经济合作,这将有助于稳定国际股票和债券市场。此外,主权基金的兴起使得新兴市场国家从发达国家的债权人转变成资产所有者,使国际金融市场的权力重心发生根本性转移,全球金融市场格局将从美国一元支配格局向欧亚国家和能源输 出国 共同参与的多元体系转变,发展中国家正逐渐成为国际金融投资的强势力量,这些都充分体现出国际经济法中的国际合作与发展原则。据美国财政部统计,仅2006年以主权基金为主体的跨国投资就使得美国资产净增加兆美元,为社会提供了1000万个就业机会,并对研发支出有13%的贡献。 最后,从所有权的角度来看,主权基金的兴起也将使世界经济重心从私营部门转向国有部门。据美国财政部估计,当前由各国政府控制的金融资本(外汇加上主权基金)约有万亿美元,相当于全球总产出的15%。长期居于主导地位的跨国公司将面临实力更强的、由政府投资的主权基金的竞争,各国的国有资产通过优化整合以后将以更加灵活的姿态投入到国际资本市场中,这将使传统的以跨国公司为主体的国际投资法律体系面临重大挑战。推动了国际经济法理论研究和制度创新,美国近期酝酿修改投资法就是一个明显的例证。 尽管主权基金的出现对国际经济法产生了十分积极的影响,在现阶段实现主权基金的法制化仍然面临着种种困境。首先,由于上千亿美元的主权基金规模十分庞大,远远超过普通的国际投资,在债券之外的市场往往会因流动性和交易量不足而难以对其充分吸纳,使得各国现行的投资法律体系无法进行有效监管。其次,由于目前大多数国家立法缺乏对主权基金信息披露的规定,使得主权基金的运作缺乏透明度,既没有准确披露是由谁控制着这些庞大的资本。也没有定期公布投资策略和资产报表等可靠信息,而相关的国际组织也没有制定严格的信息披露标准,使得对主权基金进行信息披露 的法律规制处于事实上的缺位状态。最后,基于政治与国家安全等非商业因素的考虑,部分发达国家对主权基金背后的国家背景十分谨慎,导致主权基金缺少足够的商业性与运作独立性,容易引发投资保护主义,形成投资壁垒。近年来,美国国会腰斩迪拜港口公司收购美国港口。中海油收购优尼科未果以及华为收购3Com遭美国外国投资委员会(CHIUS)否决,都带有明显的投资保护主义色彩。 主权基金的良性运作与健康发展需要在全世界范围内营造公平互利的法治环境。目前,各国已经开始重视运用法律手段来管理和规范主权基金,通过立法明确主权基金的管理体制、具体运作和投资审查,提升主权基金运作的透明度。2007年美国《外国投资与国家安全法案》规定:在涉及主权基金投资时,授权CFlUS进行为期90天的调查。直至认定该投资不会危及美国国家安全;2008年2月,在中铝收购力拓的背景下,澳大利亚政府也公布了6项法律原则,宣布将对政府控制的外国投资者加大审查力度。上述立法试图通过对主权基金加大审查力度来规范主权基金的运作,这既是一种公司治理模式,也是其保护战略资产意愿的结果。相比之下,欧盟对主权基金采取了更为积极的开放态度。为实现投资自由化的目标,2008年2月,欧盟宣布将出台主权基金行为准则,试图通过制定全球性的自律性规范来消除法律对主权基金在世界范围内自由流动的限制。欧盟贸易委员曼德尔森建议,为保护具有战略意义的欧盟公司不被主权基金收购,欧盟应考虑实施“黄金股份”制度(即政府持有带有特定权利的股份。这种股份份额很小,通常为一股,但对公司重大战略决策拥有发言权和否决权),使政府对一些涉及重要敏感行业的外来投资拥有否决权。欧盟准备出台主权基金自律准则的同时,国际货币基金组织也在制定旨在规范主权基金的行为指南。该组织已经明确要求新加坡、挪威和阿联酋等国为其主权基金制定详尽的披露标准,并开始推广挪威立法对主权基金信息披露的强制性规定,认为通过信息披露立法能够促使主权基金的规范运作,避免投资保护主义。 主权基金本质上是专业化的商业机构,而非政府的行政机关。套用行政模式势必压抑专业精神与商业 文化 ,导致类似于官僚组织的死板僵化,显然不利于其高效率运作。因此,应尽量避免对主权基金的行政干预,确保主权基金市场运营的自由度。例如,为了最大程度保证实现良好投资回报率的核心目标,阿联酋与新加坡的主权财富基金员工队伍中极少有公务员,而是竭力在国际金融市场网罗吸引招聘一流金融人才,绝大部数基金经理包括首席投资官都是外聘的专业人员。 另外,主权基金要想成为国际金融市场的一员,还必须通过立法明确主权基金的商业性、专业性和独立性,打消被投资国的政治疑虑和阻挠。在投资法中,应明确主体投资应该交由外部基金,进行第三者管理,从而淡化政治色彩,建立多策略、多通道的投资组合,加强基金间的竞争。弥补主权基金自身在资源、人才、内部监控上的不足。 [参考文献] [1]吴金勇。黄继新,伦敦G2O峰会的“教堂”价值[N],商务周刊,2009-04-20。 [2]王志刚,主权财富基金法律问题研究[J],法学与实践。2008。(4)。 [3]杨燕,主权财富基金对世界经济的影响[J],中共石家 庄市委党校学报,2009,(1)。 [4]IFSL:垒球主权财富基金增至万亿美元[N],经济参考报,2009-03-04。 [5]刘婷婷,沙特预建世界最大主权基金[N],中华工商时报,2007-12-25。 猜你喜欢: 1. 国际经济法论文题目参考目录 2. 国际经济法论文题目参考 3. 国际经济法论文免费范文 4. 国际经济法毕业论文 5. 国际经济法相关论文范文
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